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Abstract
This Note argues that one’s postal code, or where one lives within the United States or in
Northern Ireland, should not negatively impact a woman’s access to safe abortion services. This
Note will examine abortion-related jurisprudence in the United States and Northern Ireland and
will make recommendations for the ways in which access to abortion services can be legally im-
proved. Part I will explain current jurisprudence on abortion in the United States within the Due
Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause contexts. Part II will analyze the current legal frame-
work that governs access to abortion in Northern Ireland and will review its obligations under the
European Convention on Human Rights. Part III will discuss how the restrictions on abortion in
the United States and Northern Ireland must be revised to ensure access to this fundamental human
right, ensuring compliance with nondiscrimination principles under the Equal Protection Clause
and the European Convention on Human Rights. This Note will conclude by drawing parallels be-
tween the experiences that Texan and Northern Irish women face when seeking abortion services.
When legal restrictions make abortion inaccessible, these regulations are discriminatory and leave
women with no choice but to resort to unsafe measures or to carry unwanted pregnancies to term,
as is happening in the United States and Northern Ireland.
KEYWORDS: Abortion, Equal Protection, Due Process, Discrimination, Ireland, UK, US, Pri-
vacy, Equality, Texas, Criminalization
 629
NOTE 
A POSTAL CODE LOTTERY: UNEQUAL ACCESS 
TO ABORTION SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES 
AND NORTHERN IRELAND 
Hailey K. Flynn* 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 631 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PROTECTING 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES ...... 635 
A. Due Process Clause Protections for the Right to 
Abortion in the United States ............................................ 635 
1. Historical Supreme Court Jurisprudence on the 
Right to Choose Whether and When to Bear 
Children ....................................................................... 635 
2. An Undue Burden? ........................................................ 643 
B. What Have Courts Said about the Denial of Abortion 
Services as Sex Discrimination? ....................................... 650 
C. Liberty and Equality: The Due Process Clause and 
Equal Protection Doctrine Working in Tandem ................ 654 
II. NORTHERN IRELAND’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO 
ADDRESS ABORTION ......................................................... 656 
A. Northern Ireland’s Current Legal Landscape, Generally 
and as Applied to Abortion ............................................... 656 
1. Quasi-Autonomous, but Still a United Kingdom 
Jurisdiction .................................................................. 656 
2. Particular Circumstances for Northern Ireland?: The 
Legal Framework for Abortion ................................... 658 
                                                                                                             
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Fordham University School of Law; B.S. Foreign Service, 2008, 
Georgetown University. The author would like to thank the editors at the Fordham 
International Law Journal for their excellent insight and editing; Professors Martin S. Flaherty 
and Catherine Powell for their input on earlier drafts; her reproductive rights and justice 
colleagues for their inspiring, tireless work to advocate for abortion access; and her mentors, 
friends, and family for their unwavering support and encouragement. 
630 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:629 
3. Northern Irish Women Are Able to Travel to Other 
Parts of the United Kingdom to Obtain a Safe 
Abortion ...................................................................... 662 
B. European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence: Friend 
or Foe? ............................................................................... 665 
C. Impact of Criminalizing Abortion in Northern Ireland ....... 671 
III. PROTECTING ABORTION ACCESS FROM BEING A 
POSTAL CODE LOTTERY THROUGH PRIVACY 
AND EQUALITY LENSES .................................................... 674 
A. Impact of Exceptions on a Woman’s Right to Access 
Reproductive Care Within the United States .................... 674 
1. A Strong Relationship Between the Liberty Right 
and Equal Protection ................................................... 675 
2. Focus on Intersectional Discrimination to Determine 
Suspect Classification ................................................. 680 
3. The Impact of Abortion Restrictions on Access to 
Services: Zooming in on Texas ................................... 686 
B. Criminalization of Abortion in Northern Ireland: 
Discriminatory and Stigmatizing ...................................... 689 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 693 
 
“Abortion is no tragedy. No moral slip for which we forgive 
hapless, weak women. Abortion is one of the concrete, 
fundamental ways we assert women’s right to design our 
own lives. It is one of the ways we claim ourselves—for 
ourselves.”1 
- Marlene Gerber Fried 
                                                                                                             
1 . Marlene Gerber Fried, Abortion in the United States: Legal but Inaccessible, in 
ABORTION WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950-2000, 224 (Rickie Solinger ed., 
1998) (citing Stephanie Poggi, Abortion in the Media, RESIST NEWSLETTER (Feb. 1995)). 
Throughout this Note, my use of the term “woman” is shorthand for individuals that can 
become pregnant. This analysis is not intending to disregard transgender men, gender non-
conforming people, or intersex individuals that become pregnant since these legal barriers 
affect all people who become pregnant, and likely disproportionately impact people with 
diverse gender identities. However, the specific issues that people with diverse gender 
identities face are outside of the scope of this Note. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After having to wait two weeks longer than she wanted, Sandra 
was finally able to get an appointment for her abortion procedure at a 
clinic in her home state of Texas.2 Following new legal requirements, 
she needed to wait to see the same doctor who provided her a 
sonogram and mandatory counseling. 3 Unexpectedly, this doctor 
needed to have surgery, and therefore could not perform Sandra’s 
abortion at the scheduled time.4 Sandra was left either to hope that 
this doctor recovered before Texas’ twenty-week gestational limit, or 
to restart the process with another doctor (that is, if there was an 
available appointment). 5  Meeting these requirements was further 
complicated by the hundreds of miles Sandra needed to drive to the 
clinic, the amount of money needed to arrange child care for her 
daughter, and the number of days that Sandra needed to take off from 
work to visit the clinic.6 The longer that Sandra needed to wait to get 
an abortion, the more expensive the procedure became.7 If she could 
not reschedule her appointment soon, other options would include 
traveling to nearby states or taking black market drugs to induce an 
abortion. 8  Frustrated and discouraged, she hoped to obtain her 
procedure quickly, knowing that getting an abortion is her only 
option.9 
                                                                                                             
2. This description is based on Amber’s personal story of trying to get an abortion in 
Texas. The name has been changed since other facts were added. See Stories: Amber, Texas, 
DRAW THE LINE, http://www.drawtheline.org/stories/our-story-needs-to-be-told/ (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2016). 
3. See id. 
4. See id. 
5. See id. 
6. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 598 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating that 
the closest clinic within Texas is 550 miles away from El Paso); see also Fried, supra note 1, 
at 212-13 (noting the barriers that low-income women face when attempting to obtain abortion 
access). 
7. See FAQs, WOMEN’S MED, http://www.womensmed.com/faqs/faq/ (last visited Dec. 
29, 2015) (obtaining an abortion increases approximately US$100 per week after eleven weeks 
gestation). 
8 . See also Manny Fernandez & Erik Eckholm, Court Upholds Texas Limits on 
Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2015, at A1 (noting that women were already traveling to New 
Mexico to obtain abortions); Erica Hellerstein, The Rise of DIY Abortion in Texas, THE 
ATLANTIC (June 27, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/06/the-rise-of-the-
diy-abortion-in-texas/373240/ (increasing numbers of women crossing into Mexico to gain 
access to Misoprostol, which is a medicine that can be used to induce abortion, or access 
smuggled versions of the drug in the United States). 
9. See Stories: Amber, Texas, supra note 2. 
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Where women have been afforded the right to terminate 
unwanted or risky pregnancies, abortion services have made women’s 
lives safer, as maternal mortality ratios have dropped precipitously.10 
When women do not have access to abortion locally, however, most 
women are left with no choice but to carry an unwanted pregnancy to 
term or to seek a clandestine, unsafe abortion, putting their lives at 
risk.11 The women that are disproportionately affected may be low-
income women, women of color, immigrant women, and/or young 
women, raising concerns about intersectionality. 12  Conversely, 
affluent women will always find an abortion provider because neither 
cost nor travel poses an insurmountable hurdle.13 
Within the United States, a woman living in El Paso, Texas 
might need to drive 550 miles to the nearest abortion provider in the 
state.14 The ability for this woman to access an abortion depends upon 
                                                                                                             
10. See David A. Grimes et al., Unsafe Abortion: The Preventable Pandemic, 368 THE 
LANCET 1908, 1913 (2006) (noting a decrease in maternal mortality ratios when abortion is 
legal and accessible since demand shifts from clandestine, unsafe abortions to safe, legal 
ones); see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., SAFE ABORTION: TECHNICAL AND POLICY GUIDANCE 
FOR HEALTH SYSTEMS 23 (2d ed., 2012), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/70914/1/978
9241548434_eng.pdf [hereinafter 2012 SAFE ABORTION GUIDELINES] (describing the 
reduction in maternal mortality ratios when safe, legal abortion is available). 
11. See Grimes et al., supra note 10, at 1909-12 (discussing the severe health risks or 
death that may result from an unsafe abortion); see also 2012 SAFE ABORTION GUIDELINES, 
supra note 10, at 19-20 (explaining that health risks of unsafe abortion include hemorrhage; 
sepsis; peritonitis; or cervical, abdominal, vaginal, or uterine trauma). See generally Safe and 
Legal Abortion is a Woman’s Human Right, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. 1 (2011), http://www.
reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/pub_fac_safeab_10.11.pdf. 
12. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 1, at 212-13 (noting the disproportionate impact on low 
income women, women of color, and young women in the United States); see also Ctr. for 
Reprod. Rts. & Nat’l Latina Inst. for Reprod., Nuestra Voz, Nuestra Salud, Nuestro Texas: The 
Fight for Women’s Reproductive Health Care in the Rio Grande Valley, NUESTRO TEXAS 32-
33 (2013), http://www.nuestrotexas.org/pdf/NT-spread.pdf [hereinafter Nuestro Texas Report] 
(discussing the particular challenges that undocumented women face in obtaining reproductive 
health care in the Rio Grande Valley). 
13. See Laura Bassett, Map Shows Abortion Access in Texas Now Only for Wealthy, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/08/texas-abortion-
access-is-_n_5952968.html (noting that women with means can always afford to travel to 
access the abortion services that they need); see also Marcy Bloom, Need Abortion, Will 
Travel, RH REALITY CHECK (Feb. 25, 2008), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2008/02/25/
need-abortion-will-travel/ (describing the historical reality that affluent women in need of 
abortions have always traveled to where safe and legal services are available). 
14. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 598 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that 
the closest Texas clinic is 550 miles from El Paso); see also Fernandez & Eckholm, supra note 
8 (noting that the court found the 550 mile requirement permissible since women were already 
traveling to New Mexico to obtain abortions). 
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her ability to take time off from work, have access to transportation, 
and child-care arrangements for multiple days due to the waiting 
period and the current backlog that Texas clinics are facing.15 The 
Fifth Circuit reasoned that women should just cross state lines to 
Arkansas or New Mexico to access their constitutional right to an 
abortion.16 The requirement to travel across state lines to obtain an 
abortion erects significant barriers to accessing the procedure and 
reinforces the stigma of getting an abortion.17 
Similarly, in the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction, Northern 
Ireland, most women’s reasons for obtaining an abortion do not fall 
under the narrow health exception, which is the only circumstance in 
which abortion is permitted within the territory.18 As such, to obtain 
an abortion, Northern Irish women are required to find or borrow as 
much as GB£2,000 to travel to other parts of the United Kingdom to 
access abortion from a private provider.19 Due to the abortion stigma 
in Northern Ireland, taking time off from work, making child-care 
arrangements, finding money, and traveling for the procedure become 
even more complicated.20 
                                                                                                             
15. See Bassett, supra note 13 (stating that abortion restrictions in Texas are much more 
likely to impact low income women, who have less access to child and prenatal care, sex 
education, and other services). See generally Nuestro Texas Report, supra note 12 (describing 
the challenges to accessing reproductive health care in light of the clinic closures across 
Texas). 
16. See Whole Woman’s Health, 790 F.3d at 597-98 (describing that Texan women 
currently access abortions in New Mexico and can continue to do so). 
17. See generally Fried, supra note 1, 208-24 (highlighting the barriers that women face 
to obtaining abortion despite its legality within the United States); Alison Norris et al., 
Abortion Stigma: A Reconceptualization of Constituents, Causes, and Consequences, 21 
WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES S49, S49-S54 (2011) (analyzing the roots of abortion stigma, those 
affected by it, and mechanisms to address the rampant abortion stigma in society in the United 
States). 
18. See infra Part II.A (detailing the legal framework in Northern Ireland). See generally 
Amnesty Int’l, Northern Ireland: Barriers to Accessing Abortion Services, AMNESTY INT’L 
(2015), http://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/eur_45_0157_2015_northern_ireland_-_
barriers_to_accessing_abortion_services_pdf.pdf (describing the legal and practical barriers to 
abortion access in Northern Ireland). 
19. See Real Stories of Abortion in Northern Ireland: Mary’s Story, FAMILY PLANNING 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.fpa.org.uk/abortion-in-northern-ireland/video-stories (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2016) (discussing the stress of needing to find GB£2,000 before the 24 week limit when 
only diagnosed with a fetal abnormality at 20 weeks). See generally Northern Ireland: 
Barriers to Accessing Abortion Services, supra note 18 (noting the legal and actual barriers to 
abortion access in Northern Ireland). 
20. See Real Stories of Abortion in Northern Ireland: Irene’s Story, FAMILY PLANNING 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.fpa.org.uk/abortion-in-northern-ireland/video-stories (last visited 
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As these scenarios highlight, women without access to resources 
are the ones that bear the brunt of restrictive abortion policies, both in 
the United States and in Northern Ireland.21 This Note argues that 
one’s postal code, or where one lives within the United States or the 
United Kingdom, should not negatively impact a woman’s access to 
safe abortion services. This Note will examine abortion-related 
jurisprudence in the United States and Northern Ireland and will make 
recommendations for the ways in which access to abortion services 
can be legally improved. Part I will explain current jurisprudence on 
abortion in the United States within the Due Process Clause and 
Equal Protection Clause contexts. Part II will analyze the current legal 
framework that governs access to abortion in Northern Ireland and 
will review its obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Part III will discuss how the restrictions on abortion in the 
United States and Northern Ireland must be revised to ensure access 
to this fundamental human right, ensuring compliance with non-
discrimination principles under the Equal Protection Clause and the 
European Convention on Human Rights. This Note will conclude by 
drawing parallels between the experiences that Texan and Northern 
Irish women face when seeking abortion services. When legal 
restrictions make abortion inaccessible, these regulations are 
discriminatory and leave women with no choice but to resort to 
unsafe measures or to carry unwanted pregnancies to term, as is 
happening in the United States and Northern Ireland.22 
                                                                                                             
Jan. 9, 2016) (discussing the difficulties of arranging for child care, borrowing money, and 
pretending to go to London on holiday to obtain an abortion); see also Northern Ireland: 
Barriers to Accessing Abortion Services, supra note 18, at 5 (describing the suffocating stigma 
that Northern Irish women face when they decide to get an abortion). 
21. See Bassett, supra note 13 (illustrating challenges that low-income women face to 
obtain access to abortion services); see also Northern Ireland: Barriers to Accessing Abortion 
Services, supra note 18 (detailing the barriers that Northern Irish women face to access safe 
abortion services). 
22. See Safe and Legal Abortion is a Woman’s Human Right, supra note 11 (describing 
the choice that women are forced to make when they are unable to access safe abortion 
services); see also Grimes et al., supra note 10, at 1908 (describing the high incidence of 
unsafe abortions when abortion is criminalized or legal, but not easily accessible). 
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I. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PROTECTING REPRODUCTIVE 
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
This Part will (A) discuss the way in which the right to obtain an 
abortion is protected under the liberty interests as part of the Due 
Process Clause, (B) review how US courts have mostly declined to 
recognize the denial of access to abortions as sex discrimination under 
the Equal Protection Clause, and (C) analyze the way in which the 
Supreme Court has sometimes used the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses to address discrimination. Reviewing the ways in 
which these legal protections of the fundamental right to abortion 
have been implemented will be compared to the Northern Irish legal 
framework in Part III. 
A. Due Process Clause Protections for the Right to Abortion in the 
United States 
This Section will (1) review foundational jurisprudence on 
contraceptives and abortion, detailing the scope of access to the right 
to abortion and (2) lay out the current regulations before the courts 
under the undue burden analysis, focusing on current challenges in 
the states of Mississippi, Texas, and Wisconsin. Finally, this Section 
will (3) review other areas of US legal doctrine that could be 
persuasive on this issue. 
1. Historical Supreme Court Jurisprudence on the Right to Choose 
Whether and When to Bear Children 
The right to an abortion has been guaranteed under the Due 
Process Clause, which states that no one shall be “deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law.”23 The protection of 
the fundamental right to abortion began with the principles that the 
Court laid out in guaranteeing the right to contraceptives.24 Griswold 
                                                                                                             
23 . U.S. CONST. Amends. V, XIV. The Due Process Clause appears twice in the 
Constitution; the Fifth Amendment protects against federal incursions into a person’s due 
process rights whereas the Fourteenth Amendment addresses potential abuses by individual 
states. Id. As such, when a federal regulation is alleged to infringe on the right to abortion, 
litigants will rely on the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Conversely, when a state 
regulation is at issue, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause will be the basis for the 
challenge. 
24.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 926-27 (1992) 
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v. Connecticut initially established the right to access and use 
contraceptives for married couples, which was guaranteed under the 
right to privacy within marriage.25 Since the right to privacy itself is 
not explicitly stated in the Bill of Rights, the Griswold Court held that 
“[t]he foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees 
that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create 
zones of privacy.”26 Griswold established that contraceptive use in 
marriage fell within the right to privacy from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion as a fundamental, constitutional right, forming 
the bedrock of reproductive rights law. 27  Notably, these rights 
protections were only guaranteed within the confines of marriage 
after Griswold, leaving room for the expansion of these rights to their 
unmarried counterparts.28 
                                                                                                             
[T]his Court also has held that the fundamental right of privacy protects citizens 
against governmental intrusion in such intimate family matters as procreation, child-
rearing, marriage, and contraceptive choice. These cases embody the principle that 
personal decisions that profoundly affect bodily integrity, identity, and destiny 
should be largely beyond the reach of government. In Roe v. Wade, this Court 
correctly applied these principles to a woman’s right to choose abortion.  
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (referencing Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion as well as the holding in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) and Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (noting the fundamental right to 
bodily autonomy, which includes the right to decide whether or when to bear a child). 
25. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (challenging a Connecticut statute that 
made it unlawful to use or prescribe contraceptives); see also Caroline Kane & Nina Ramos, 
Healthcare Law Chapter: Contraception and Privacy, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 643, 643-45 
(2004) (noting that Griswold first protected the constitutional right to privacy for married 
persons to use contraceptives under the liberty prong of the Due Process Clause). 
26. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (explaining how the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments to the Constitution provided guarantees of the right to privacy within the rights 
that these Amendments protect). 
27 . See Lance Gable, Law Review Symposium 2010: Reproductive Rights, Human 
Rights, and the Human Right to Health: Article: Reproductive Health as a Human Right, 60 
CASE W. RES. 957, 972 (2010) (discussing Griswold as the foundation for Roe and its 
progeny, which continue to be the focal point of the reproductive rights conversation); see also 
Janel A. George, 2012 Feminist Legal Theory Conference: Beyond a Beautiful Fraud: Using a 
Human Rights Framework to Realize the Promise of Democracy, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 277, 
286 (2013) (describing Griswold as foundational to mainstream reproductive rights 
jurisprudence in the 1960s and 1970s). 
28. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (focusing on the fundamental importance of marital 
privacy); see also 50 Years After the Griswold v. Connecticut Decision: Fact Sheet, NAT’L 
WOMEN’S LAW CTR. (2015), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/griswold_anniversar
y_6.2.155.pdf. 
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The right to use and access contraceptives was expanded in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird to unmarried couples.29 The Court held on Equal 
Protection grounds that its prior rationale to strike down the statute 
banning contraceptives to protect against unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into a marriage per se violated the rights of single persons 
wishing to use contraceptives.30 Similarly situated individuals need to 
be treated alike; the Court held that this disparate treatment that 
unmarried couples experienced when attempting to access 
contraceptives amounted to an unlawful violation of their right to 
privacy.31 “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”32 By using 
the Equal Protection framework, focusing on matters of equality 
rather than liberty, the Eisenstadt Court ensured that all similarly 
situated individuals should have equal access to their fundamental 
right to privacy, including the right to contraceptives. 33  Taken 
together, Griswold and Eisenstadt firmly established that the right to 
access contraceptives fell within the right to privacy, which was an 
                                                                                                             
29. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (expanding the privacy right by 
determining that it is the individual, who is either single or married, who needs to make the 
fundamental decision of whether or when to bear a child); see also 50 Years After the Griswold 
v. Connecticut Decision: Fact Sheet, supra note 28 (noting Eisenstadt’s expansion of the 
fundamental right to use contraceptives to unmarried couples). 
30. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443 (noting that the Massachusetts statute violated Equal 
Protection for single persons). See generally 50 Years After the Griswold v. Connecticut 
Decision: Fact Sheet, supra note 28 (highlighting the importance of Eisenstadt’s expansion of 
the fundamental right to use contraceptives to unmarried couples). 
31. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446-47 (citing Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 
415 (1920)) (emphasizing that people cannot be placed into different categories and treated 
differently arbitrarily); see also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (holding that an 
Idaho probate statute violates the Equal Protection of the Constitution by allowing preferential 
treatment of male over female applicants to be administrator of a decedent’s estate since this 
classification does not pass a heightened scrutiny test). 
32. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (establishing the fundamental right to bodily autonomy 
for single and married women alike). See generally Robert C. Farrell, An Excess of Methods: 
Identifying Implied Fundamental Rights in the Supreme Court, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 
203 (2007) (discussing the way in which the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
worked in tandem in Eisenstadt to ground the fundamental right to decide whether or when to 
bear a child). 
33. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (noting that denying unmarried access to 
contraceptives amounted to a violation of their right to privacy). 
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essential step for extending the right to privacy to encompass access 
to abortion.34 
Examining the legality of accessing abortion, Roe v. Wade 
established the right by holding “the right of personal privacy 
includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified 
and must be considered against important state interests in 
regulation.” 35  In this framework, Roe examined the rights of the 
potential life, asserting that these rights limit—yet do not 
extinguish—a woman’s right to choose whether and when to have 
children.36 Roe relied on the liberty provision under the Due Process 
Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment rather than Equal Protection 
grounds. 37  Reliance on liberty demonstrated the importance of 
freedom from governmental intrusion to make decisions on whether 
and when to bear a child and represented a continued revitalization of 
the substantive due process framework, resurrected in Griswold. 38 
Although both aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment do protect 
unwarranted government intrusion into fundamental rights, the Equal 
Protection Clause provides an additional buffer against statutes that 
de jure discriminate against a particular class of people.39 
                                                                                                             
34. See 50 Years After the Griswold v. Connecticut Decision: Fact Sheet, supra note 28, 
at 2 (highlighting the role that Griswold and Eisenstadt played in opening the door to the 
fundamental Constitutional right to abortion); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (explaining that the 
privacy discussed in Griswold is between two individuals, thus requiring privacy from 
governmental intrusion to be protected in women’s childbearing decisions). 
35. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (indicating the primary importance of 
women’s autonomy, but that there are some instances in which there are potential compelling 
state interests in a potential life that may outweigh the woman’s rights). 
36. Id. at 162-64 (stating that the fetus only represents a potential life, and therefore 
cannot override the woman’s health interests). See generally Khiara M. Bridges, “Life” in the 
Balance: Judicial Review of Abortion Regulations, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1285 (2013) 
(explaining the challenges of regulating the interests in women’s health and potential fetal life 
following Roe). 
37. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (focusing the due process rationale protected abortion as a 
liberty interest where a woman had the right to choose to obtain an abortion rather than 
looking at deprivation of abortion services as sex discrimination under equal protection); cf. 
Farrell, supra note 32, at 210-12 (discussing the overlap of the due process and equal 
protection doctrines in protecting fundamental rights in Roe). 
38. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also Ryan C. Williams, Symposium, 
The Evolution of Theory: The Paths to Griswold, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2155, 2176-82 
(2014) (noting the evolution of using emanations in the penumbras to ground the right to 
privacy in the Bill of Rights in Griswold and the path back to using the substantive due process 
doctrine). 
39. See generally Farrell, supra note 32 (noting the interchangeability of the way that the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses are used to protect fundamental rights); Yifat 
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Subsequent cases have narrowed the scope of a woman’s right to 
obtain an abortion. 40  Although Planned Parenthood v. Casey is 
commonly regarded as the case that vastly limits the breadth of Roe 
since it developed the undue burden standard, this trend began under 
Harris v. McRae by upholding the constitutionality of the Hyde 
Amendment. 41  The Hyde Amendment restricts the cases in which 
Medicaid funding can be used to pay for abortions to solely instances 
of rape, incest, or life endangerment.42 The McRae Court held that the 
Hyde Amendment does not violate the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause or the Equal Protection Clause under rational basis scrutiny.43 
Although women have a constitutionally protected right to abortion, 
the McRae Court held that this constitutional right does not create a 
positive obligation for the government to ensure access to the 
                                                                                                             
Bitton, The Limits of Equality and the Virtues of Discrimination, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 593 
(2006) (comparing the legal remedies for de jure versus de facto discrimination and noting that 
Equal Protection most directly deals with de jure discrimination). 
40. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (prohibiting Medicaid funding from 
covering abortion services); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
(abrogating the trimester framework, developing the undue burden standard, and upholding 
regulations including parental consent laws and mandatory waiting periods); Gonzalez v. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (imposing a federal ban on the safer second trimester procedure 
since an alternative existed). 
41. The undue burden standard under the Due Process Clause is an intermediate tier of 
scrutiny, and falls between strict scrutiny and rational basis. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78 
(establishing the undue burden standard, which is when “a state regulation has the purpose or 
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a 
nonviable fetus.”); McRae, 448 U.S. at 318 (couching a low income woman’s inability to 
access abortion as a result of poverty as obstacle of her own creation, which the government is 
not obligated to cure). 
42 . Pub. L. 96-123 § 109 (1979) (noting the citation for the challenged Hyde 
Amendment under McRae). A version of the Hyde Amendment has been reauthorized 
annually since 1977. See The Hyde Amendment Creates an Unacceptable Barrier to Women 
Getting Abortions: Fact Sheet, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., 1 (July 2015), http://www.nwlc.
org/sites/default/files/pdfs/the_hyde_amendment_creates_an_unacceptable_barrier.pdf (noting 
the impact that the Hyde Amendment continues to have on women who wish to obtain an 
abortion). 
43. McRae, 448 U.S. at 316-18 (noting that the government is not obligated to ensure 
that there are not barriers to realizing constitutional rights protections). Rational basis scrutiny 
is when the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. See, e.g., Williamson 
v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (stating that since the purpose of the statute is 
rationally related to the legitimate government objective, then the Court cannot strike down the 
statute as a violation of the Due Process Clause. This case also illustrates that rational basis 
review is a deferential standard). 
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procedure. 44  The McRae Court described the United States 
government’s obligations as follows: 
But, regardless of whether the freedom of a woman to choose  to 
terminate her pregnancy for health reasons lies at the core or the 
periphery of the due process liberty recognized in Wade, it 
simply does not follow that a woman’s freedom of choice carries 
with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to 
avail herself of the full range of protected choices. . . . although 
government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman’s 
exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not 
of its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category. The 
financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman’s ability to 
enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of 
choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on access 
to abortions, but rather of her indigency.45 
By stripping low-income women of their ability to use Medicaid 
funding to pay for an abortion, many have argued that their right to 
access an abortion is virtually eliminated.46 
When the Court decided Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
critically, it upheld the fundamental right to an abortion prior to 
viability.47 However, it is widely criticized for its development of the 
undue burden standard as a lesser level of protection for the 
                                                                                                             
44. McRae, 448 U.S. at 316-18 (stating that the Constitutional protections do not confer 
an entitlement to ensure that there are no barriers to the realization of that right). See generally 
Kris Palencia, Harris v. McRae: Indigent Women Must Bear the Consequences of the Hyde 
Amendment, 12 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 255 (1981) (explaining the legal challenges to the Hyde 
Amendment). 
45. McRae, 448 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added). 
46. See generally Palencia, supra note 44, at 255 (describing the ways in which low 
income women are forced to bear the brunt of the Hyde Amendment, effectively eliminating 
their right to choose whether to obtain an abortion since it is not affordable); The Hyde 
Amendment Creates An Unacceptable Barrier to Women Getting Abortions: Fact Sheet, supra 
note 42 (describing the burdens that the Hyde Amendment places on low income women and 
the disproportionate impact of the Hyde Amendment on women of color). 
47. Viability when the fetus can sustain life outside of the womb—a fact-specific inquiry 
for each pregnancy—but generally thought to be between twenty-four to twenty-eight weeks. 
See, e.g., Viability (Nonviable or Viable), BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (2012); see Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992) (amending the legal framework 
within which abortion restrictions can be viewed as legitimate state interests); cf. Alan 
Brownstein, How Rights are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in Constitutional 
Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 867-78 (1994) (viewing access to fundamental rights under 
the Constitution through the prism of abortion jurisprudence after the development of the 
undue burden standard in Casey). 
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fundamental right to an abortion.48 Under the undue burden standard, 
government regulations designed to encourage women to continue the 
pregnancy are permitted, as long as these restrictions do not pose “a 
substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”49 
Among the regulations under review were parental consent, informed 
consent, and waiting period requirements, each of which was upheld 
under the undue burden standard.50 Under the liberty interest of the 
Due Process Clause, the undue burden standard of review serves as a 
lower tier of scrutiny than strict scrutiny but a higher tier than rational 
basis, introducing ambiguity into the rights protections that the 
fundamental abortion right receives. 51  Furthermore, since only the 
spousal notification requirement was struck down under the undue 
burden standard, the remaining restrictions that were upheld suggest 
that the standard is deferential to the legislature when determining 
whether regulations pose a substantial obstacle to a woman’s right to 
choose.52 
Mazurek v. Armstrong subsequently demonstrates that the 
substantial obstacle threshold is high by upholding a restriction where 
only physicians can perform abortions. 53  Despite the fact that a 
                                                                                                             
48. Casey, 505 U.S. at 875-79 (describing the scope of the undue burden standard); see 
also Brownstein, supra note 47, 867-92 (describing the ambiguities of the undue burden 
threshold). 
49 . Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78 (citing parental consent requirements and other 
regulations intending to improve the woman’s health as an example of a permissible restriction 
on women’s right to choose). O’Connor also argues that informed consent requirements and 24 
hour mandatory waiting periods before obtaining an abortion do not constitute an undue 
burden on a woman’s right to choose. Id. at 882-83. 
50. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-87 (noting the rationale for why parental consent 
for minors, a mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period, and informed consent requirements 
do not pose a substantial obstacle to a woman’s right to choose), with id. at 887-95 (detailing 
how spousal notification puts women’s safety at risk, for example, by subjecting them to 
increased risk of physical assault). 
51. See generally Bridges, supra note 36 (describing where the undue burden standard 
falls as a tier of scrutiny); Brownstein, supra note 47 (explaining where the undue burden 
standard of scrutiny fits into the protection of fundamental rights). 
52. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-79 (stating that women must be able to make the ultimate 
decision about whether or not to terminate a pregnancy). But see Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 
U.S. 968 (1997) (upholding a physician only provider requirement where a statute was passed 
to target a particular physician’s assistant that provided abortions). See generally Part I.B 
(describing how regulations in effect have made it more difficult to obtain abortion services 
throughout the United States). 
53. See Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 971-73 (claiming that the physician only requirement 
would not pose a substantial obstacle in practical effect for women wishing to obtain an 
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physician-assistant was the sole non-physician abortion provider in 
the state at the time of the passage of the physician-only requirement, 
the Supreme Court held that there was insufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that this regulation would pose a substantial obstacle to a 
woman’s right to choose.54 In 2007, the Supreme Court upheld the 
Congressional “partial birth abortion ban” in Gonzales v. Carhart, 
determining that banning an intact dilation and evacuation (“Intact 
D&E”) procedure was reasonable despite the fact that an Intact D&E 
was the safest second-trimester abortion procedure alternative 
available to women.55 The Court concludes that since “[a]lternatives 
are available to the prohibited procedure,” this ban did not constitute a 
“substantial obstacle” to a woman’s right to choose.56 Carhart marks 
a continuation of the trend, illustrating the difficulty of showing that a 
particular restriction poses a substantial obstacle to abortion and 
demonstrating how high the threshold is to strike down regulations 
that impinge upon a woman’s right to choose.57 
                                                                                                             
abortion); Bridges, supra note 36, at 1290-94 (describing the weaknesses in the undue burden 
framework). 
54. See Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 973-74 (focusing on the fact that the statute might have a 
harmful effect is immaterial if it does not pose a substantial obstacle for women seeking access 
to abortion); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (restricting physicians from practicing 
a safer second trimester abortion procedure since there was a similar, yet less safe available 
alternative). 
55. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 162 (noting “intact D&E decreases the risk of cervical 
laceration or uterine perforation because it requires fewer passes into the uterus with surgical 
instruments and does not require the removal of . . . fragments that may be sharp”); see also 
Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Gonzales v. Carhart, Nos. 05-380/1382 (Nov. 2006) (explaining the 
medical reasons that Intact D&E is safer for women than a standard Dilation & Evacuation 
(“D&E”) procedure and emphasizing that it is critical for the Intact D&E procedure to remain 
legal). 
56. The available alternatives that the Court refers to are standard D&E procedures, 
which can also be performed during the second trimester. Compare Carhart, 550 U.S. at 156, 
164 (stating that since the majority of D&E procedures would not be prohibited, this cannot 
amount to an undue burden), with Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 
(1992) (“And a statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid 
state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice 
cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.”). 
57. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 156, 164; see also Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 
972 (1997) (noting that because of insufficient evidence in the record that there would be a 
substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion, anti-abortion activists targeting a particular 
provider or the fact that there might be a harmful effect of the effect of the statute were 
deemed immaterial).  
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Although the core holding in Roe has remained intact through 
Casey and its progeny, these subsequent cases have vastly narrowed 
the scope of a woman’s ability to terminate her pregnancy by 
safeguarding limits on who can actually obtain an abortion, alongside 
various state-level regulations that have served to increase waiting 
periods and introduced onerous restrictions. 58  Even when these 
restrictions do not meet the “undue burden” threshold, many of the 
regulations have either forced clinics to close or required women to 
jump through hoops to access a constitutionally protected medical 
procedure.59 
2. An Undue Burden? 
Three years after Carhart was decided, Tea Party Republicans 
were elected to Congress and state legislatures throughout the country 
and passed 288 anti-abortion regulations since 2011, amounting to 
more restrictions than were passed in the prior decade.60 Many of 
these statutes are known as the Targeted Restrictions of Abortion 
Providers (“TRAP laws”), which are medically unnecessary 
requirements for facilities providing abortions that do not make the 
procedure safer for women, requiring providers to have admitting 
privileges at local hospitals or for clinics to meet the building 
                                                                                                             
58. See infra Part I.B (describing the impact that the targeted regulation of abortion 
providers has had on accessing abortion in many states across the United States). 
59. See The Editorial Board, The Reproductive Rights Rollback of 2015, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 19, 2015, at SR10 (describing the increase in the passage of legislative measures, making 
it more difficult to access abortion procedures). See generally Esmé E. Deprez, The Vanishing 
U.S. Abortion Clinic, Bloomberg QuickTake (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.bloombergview.
com/quicktake/abortion-and-the-decline-of-clinics (describing the current expanse of anti-
abortion legislation that has been able to limit the provision of abortion services); Heather D. 
Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, A Surge of State Abortion Restrictions Puts Providers—and the 
Women They Serve—in the Crosshairs, 17 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. (2014), http://www.
guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/17/1/gpr170109.html (analyzing the impact that the flood of 
restrictions on abortion have had on accessing the procedure). 
60. Tea Party Republicans emerged as an anti-Washington, libertarian faction of the 
party in 2010 for which its vehement opposition to abortion has been essential for maintaining 
the unity of the Republican party. See Jamal Greene, What the New Deal Settled, 15 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 265, 282-83 (2013); see also Elizabeth Nash et al., Laws Affecting Reproductive 
Health and Rights: 2013 State Policy Review: Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. tbl.1 (2014), http
://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2013/statetrends42013.html (illustrating substantial 
increase in number of abortion restrictions between 2011-2013 as compared to entire previous 
decade); Deprez, supra note 59 (highlighting the spike in anti-abortion regulations since 2010).  
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standards of ambulatory surgical centers.61 These requirements have 
been challenged in various court cases, testing the limits of the undue 
burden standard.62 
In Mississippi, the state legislature passed requirements for all 
physicians who perform abortions to obtain staff and admitting 
privileges to a local hospital through House Bill 1390 (“H.B. 
1390”). 63  Since the hospitals have been unwilling to grant these 
privileges, if H.B. 1390 goes into effect, the only remaining clinic 
providing abortion services in the state would be forced to close its 
doors. 64  In Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. Currier, the 
Fifth Circuit held that Mississippi could not satisfy its Constitutional 
obligations by requiring women to travel to a different state to avail 
                                                                                                             
61. See generally Targeted Restrictions of Abortion Providers: States Policies in Brief, 
GUTTMACHER INST. 1-2 (2015), https://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_TRAP.pdf 
(describing the most common types of TRAP laws and noting the scope of these restrictions in 
each of the states where TRAP laws have been passed or are in effect). See also Rachel 
Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, TRAP Laws Gain Political Traction While Abortion Clinics—
and the Women They Serve—Pay the Price, 16 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 8-10 (2013); 
Stephen Bendheim, Holly Puritz & Christian Chisholm, Letter to Karen Remley, 
Commissioner of Health, Virginia Department of Health, from Virginia Section, American 
Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, V (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.acog.org/About_
ACOG/ACOG_Departments/State_Legislative_Activities/~/media/Departments/State%20Legi
slative%20Activities/2011VAACOGltrVDH.pdf. 
62. See Currier v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, Docket No. 14-997 (filed Feb. 
18, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/currier-v-jackson-womens-health-org
anization/ (appealing the Fifth Circuit decision holding that the admitting privileges 
requirement constituted an undue burden); see also Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 
Docket No. 15-274 (granted Nov. 13, 2015) (previously known as Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Cole) (challenging the Fifth Circuit’s decision that the admitting privileges and ambulatory 
surgical center requirements did not constitute an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose 
an abortion). At the time of writing, only Whole Woman’s Health’s petition for 
certiorari has been granted. 
63 . Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(explaining the requirements that HB 1390 imposed on the sole provider of abortion in the 
state); Mississippi H.B. 1390 § 1(f) (describing the admitting privileges requirement for 
abortion providers). 
64. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 760 F.3d at 457-58 (describing the Constitutional 
problems with closing the only abortion provider in the state); see also Deprez, supra note 59 
(noting that Mississippi is one of four states in the U.S. where there is only one abortion 
provider to serve the entire state); Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic 
Closings: When “Protecting Health” Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 23 (forthcoming 2016) 
(stating reasons that hospitals are unwilling to grant admitting privileges and their far-reaching 
practical effect). 
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themselves of their rights, relying on Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada.65   
Gaines simply and plainly holds that a state cannot lean on its 
sovereign neighbors to provide protection of its citizens’ federal 
constitutional rights. . . . Gaines locks the gate for Mississippi 
to escape under another state’s protective umbrella and thus 
requires us to conduct the undue burden inquiry by only looking 
at the ability of Mississippi women to exercise their right within 
Mississippi’s borders.66 
The Fifth Circuit noted the undue burden created by 
extinguishing the right to obtain an abortion within Mississippi’s 
borders by requiring abortion providers to obtain medically 
unnecessary admitting privileges at a local hospital, further noting,  
Such a proposal would not only place an undue burden on the 
exercise of the constitutional right, but would also disregard a 
state’s obligation under the principle of federalism—applicable 
to all fifty states—to accept the burden of the non-delegable duty 
of protecting the established federal constitutional rights of its 
own citizens.67  
Mississippi filed a Petition for Certiorari, but at the time of writing, 
the Court had not yet determined whether it will hear the case.68 
                                                                                                             
65. See State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (noting that 
Missouri cannot fulfill its constitutional obligations by relying on services available in other 
states). Compare Jackson Women’s Health Org., 760 F.3d at 449 (discussing how the State 
could not discharge its Constitutional obligations to another state under the principle of 
Federalism), with Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that 
Texan women should be required to cross state lines to obtain abortion services since El Paso 
share metropolitan area with Santa Teresa, New Mexico). 
66. See Jackson Women’s Health Org., 760 F.3d at 463 (relying upon State of Missouri 
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, where the Court held that Missouri was in violation of Equal 
Protection by denying the African American male admission to a Missouri law school on the 
basis of race, but providing a stipend to attend law school in another state); see also Campbell 
Robertson & Erik Eckholm, Judges Block Abortion Curb in Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/us/mississippi-abortion-clinic-federal-court-block
s-closing.html?_r=0 (describing the result of the Fifth Circuit opinion, noting the American 
College of Gynecologists and Obstetricians brief that asserts that admitting privileges 
requirements are medically unnecessary to guarantee the safety of an abortion). 
67. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 760 F.3d at 449. 
68. See Currier v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., Docket No. 14-997, http://www.scotus
blog.com/case-files/cases/currier-v-jackson-womens-health-organization/ (last visited Jan. 11, 
2016) (listing the status of the challenge to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in favor of Jackson 
Women’s Health Organization); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Docket No. 14-
___997 (Feb. 18, 2015), Jackson Women’s Health Org., 760 F.3d (filing a Petition for 
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Texas has also passed TRAP laws in House Bill 2 (“H.B. 2”) 
where physicians are required to have admitting privileges to local 
hospitals, and any venue where abortions are performed is required to 
be outfitted as an ambulatory surgical center.69  The law has been 
enjoined in part since its passage, but if it goes into effect completely, 
as few as eight clinics in urban areas would remain to serve the entire 
state of Texas.70 Texas has a state population of approximately 27 
million people and a square mileage of 268,596, which is larger than 
Australia in population and Afghanistan in square mileage.71 
Following a negative judgment in the Fifth Circuit in June 2015, 
the Supreme Court granted Whole Woman’s Health’s stay and 
subsequently its petition for a writ of certiorari.72 The Petition for 
Certiorari alleges that if a regulation merely states that its objectives 
are to protect women’s health and ensure access to safe abortion 
                                                                                                             
Certiorari on behalf of the State of Mississippi); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari: Brief in 
Opposition, Docket No. 14-997 (Apr. 21, 2015), Currier v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 760 
F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2014) (filing a response to the Petition on behalf of Jackson Women’s 
Health Organization). 
69. Texas H.B. 2 (2013) §§ 2, 4 (describing the admitting privileges requirement in 
section 2 and the ambulatory surgical center requirement in section 4, both of which are 
currently being challenged); Texas Omnibus Abortion Bill H.B. 2: RHRC Data, RH REALITY 
CHECK, http://data.rhrealitycheck.org/law/texas-omnibus-abortion-bill-hb-2-2013/ (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Texas Omnibus Abortion Bill Data] (describing the provisions of 
H.B. 2). 
70. See Bassett, supra note 13 (illustrating the clinic closures that would result if H.B. 2 
goes fully into effect in Texas, where only eight clinics would remain open); see also Texas 
Omnibus Abortion Bill Data, supra note 69 (describing the status of the court challenges to the 
relevant H.B. 2 provisions). 
71 . See State and County QuickFacts: Texas, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045214/48,00 (last visited Jan. 11, 2016) (noting 
that Texas’ 2014 population estimate is 26,956,958); see also U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. 
AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIVISION, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2015 REVISION, KEY 
FINDINGS AND ADVANCED TABLES, ESA/P/WP.241, 13-17 (2015) (listing the population by 
country). Compare State Area Measurements and Internal Point Coordinates, UNITED STATES 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/state-area.html (last visited Jan. 11, 
2016), with Square Miles: Countries Compared, NATIONMASTER, http://www.nationmaster.
com/country-info/stats/Geography/Land-area/Square-miles (last visited Jan. 11, 2016) 
(illustrating that the area of Texas is larger than the area of most countries of Myanmar 
(Burma), Afghanistan, and France).  
72. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding in favor 
of the State of Texas, allowing the H.B. 2 provisions to go into effect); Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Docket No. 14-50928 (2015), Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th 
Cir. 2015) (granted Nov. 13, 2015) (this case has been renamed Whole Woman's Health v. 
Hellerstedt) (arguing that the Fifth Circuit decision is wrongly decided since the regulations 
violate the undue burden standard and restricts access to safe abortion services). 
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services, this statement alone is insufficient to meet the legitimate 
purpose requirement under the Due Process Clause.73 To avoid the 
imposition of a substantial obstacle in purpose or effect under the 
undue burden requirement, the Court must be able to review the 
actual effect on women’s health, since H.B. 2 would have the impact 
of closing three-quarters of the clinics that were in operation prior to 
its passage.74 In its decision, the Fifth Circuit also distinguishes Whole 
Woman’s Health from Jackson on Equal Protection grounds, stating 
that the effect of the admitting privilege requirements in Mississippi 
would be to close the only clinic in the state whereas women living on 
the Texas border who faced clinic closures would be able to visit the 
clinics in Arkansas or New Mexico.75 
Admitting privileges requirements in Wisconsin have also been 
challenged. 76  The Wisconsin statute dictated that doctors that 
provided abortions needed to have admitting privileges to hospitals 
within thirty miles of the facility where the abortion was provided.77 
In Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Schimel, the Seventh Circuit 
upheld the West District of Wisconsin’s decision that the admitting 
privileges requirements were unconstitutional as they violated the 
                                                                                                             
73. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 72, at *2, *13-*17 (arguing that the Court 
must review the extent to which the regulation actually benefits women’s health under the 
undue burden standard since the regulation cannot have the purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle on a woman’s right to obtain an abortion prior to viability); see also 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (“A finding of an undue 
burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable 
fetus.”). 
74. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 72, at *33-34 (noting the impact that H.B. 
2 would have on clinic closures throughout Texas); see also Bassett, supra note 13 
(highlighting that if H.B. 2 goes into effect, the remaining clinics would be clustered in urban 
areas). 
75 . Compare Whole Woman’s Health, 790 F.3d at 563 (noting that Texan women 
already cross the border into New Mexico to obtain abortion), with Jackson Women’s Health 
Organization v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2014) (“So long as the undue burden analysis 
is confined by Mississippi’s borders, the closure of that state’s sole abortion provider must be 
an undue burden.”). 
76. At the time of writing, the State of Wisconsin has not filed a Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari. See Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, No. 15-1736 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(discussing the permanent injunction of the admitting privileges requirement); see also Wis. 
Stat. § 253.095(2) (stating that abortion providers must have admitting privileges to hospitals 
within thirty miles of the clinic where the abortion is provided). 
77. Wis. Stat. § 253.095(2) (establishing that doctors providing abortion must have 
admitting privileges to hospitals within thirty miles of the abortion clinic); see also Wis. Stat. § 
940.15(5) (stating that only doctors are permitted to perform abortions in Wisconsin). 
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undue burden standard established under Casey. 78  In his opinion, 
Judge Posner emphasized that the inability to obtain admitting 
privileges would result in halving the number of abortion clinics in 
the state, reducing the capacity of the clinics that are able to continue 
operating, and not providing significant additional benefits beyond 
the existing hospital transfer protocols. 79  The State of Wisconsin 
argues that women in need of late-term abortions can travel to 
Chicago, in neighboring Illinois, since it is roughly ninety miles from 
Milwaukee.80 The Schimel court relies on Gaines and Ezell v. City of 
Chicago, noting that one’s liberty to enjoy constitutional rights cannot 
be curtailed based upon the assumption that the right to an abortion 
can be exercised in another jurisdiction, making this an 
unconstitutional alternative to providing abortion within Wisconsin.81 
Querying whether admitting privileges would improve women’s 
health, Judge Posner emphasized that abortion complications are “rare 
and rarely dangerous—a fact that further attenuates the need for 
abortion doctors to have admitting privileges” and are four times less 
                                                                                                             
78. Schimel, No. 15-1736 at 14-15 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin v. Van 
Hollen, No. 13-cv-465-wc, 2013 WL 3989238 at *10 n. 26 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 2, 2013) (“[T]he 
complete absence of an admitting privileges requirement for [other] clinical [i.e., outpatient] 
procedures including for those with greater risk [than abortion] is certainly evidence that [the] 
Wisconsin’s legislature’s only purpose in its enactment was to restrict the availability of safe, 
legal abortion in this State, particularly given the lack of any demonstrable medical benefit for 
its requirement either presented to the Legislature or [to] this court.” (emphasis in original)); 
see also Tara Culp-Ressler, Judge Explains the Dangerously Successful Strategy Against 
Abortion Rights in Three Sentences, THINK PROGRESS (Nov. 24, 2015), http://thinkprogress.
org/health/2015/11/24/3725319/wisconsin-abortion-federal-court/ (describing how restrictions 
on abortion have served to significantly reduce access and were held to be unconstitutional in 
the Seventh Circuit). 
79. Schimel, No. 15-1736 at 6-7, 25 (describing how women’s access to essential health 
services is decreased and does not benefit women); see also Culp-Ressler, supra note 78 
(noting that restrictions on abortion providers do not enhance the safety of abortion 
procedures, which are already safe and result in few complications). 
80. Schimel, No. 15-1736 at 20-22 (emphasizing that eighteen to twenty-four percent of 
women that would need to travel to Chicago or its surrounding areas would not be able to 
travel, for various reasons); see id. at 22-23 (quoting Planned Parenthood Arizona v. Humble, 
753 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
81. Id. at 20-21 (citing Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 697 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(citations omitted) (noting that one’s constitutional right to free speech cannot be abridged 
based upon the idea that it can be exercised in another place)); see also State of Missouri ex 
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 350 (1938) (“[T]he obligation of the State to give the 
protection of equal laws can be performed only where its laws operate, that is, within its own 
jurisdiction.”). 
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likely to occur than other routine procedures such as colonoscopies.82 
Judge Posner highlighted many legislatures’ purposes when passing 
TRAP laws in their respective states: 
[ ] convincing the Court to overrule Roe v. Wade and [Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey] is a steep uphill fight, and so some of them 
proceed indirectly, seeking to discourage abortions by making it 
more difficult for women to obtain them. They may do this in the 
name of protecting the health of women who have abortions, yet 
as in this case the specific measures they support may do little or 
nothing for health, but rather strew impediments to abortion. . . . 
Opponents of abortion reveal their true objectives when they 
procure legislation limited to a medical procedure—abortion—
that rarely produces a medical emergency.83 
Since these TRAP laws disproportionately impact lower-income 
women and do not improve women’s health to a sufficient extent to 
justify the curtailment of the constitutional right to abortion, the 
permanent injunction on the admitting privileges requirement was 
upheld.84   
In addition to these requirements, legislatures have also passed a 
wave of mandatory ultrasound laws.85 In North Carolina, for example, 
providers were not only required to administer an ultrasound, but also 
were mandated by the state to describe fetal development details, 
                                                                                                             
82 . Schimel, No. 15-1736 at 8, 12 (describing that corollary admitting privileges 
requirements do not exist for procedures that produce more complications such as 
colonoscopies); see also Emily Crockett, The Case Against Anti-Abortion “Admitting 
Privileges” Laws, in One Court Ruling, VOX POL’Y & POLITICS (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.
vox.com/2015/11/25/9801108/anti-abortion-scott-walker-defeat (describing the ways in which 
admitting privileges requirements do not improve women’s health, including the fact that no 
other outpatient procedures-including those with higher complication rates—required 
admitting privileges). 
83. Schimel, No. 15-1736 at 25. 
84 . See infra Part III.A.1-2 (discussing the disproportionate impact of abortion 
restrictions on low-income individuals); Schimel, No. 15-1736 at 20-23, 25-26, 28-29 
(describing that admitting privilege requirements do not have a strong medical justification, 
and therefore are more likely to pose an undue burden on a woman’s right to access abortion 
services). 
85. See State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept. 
1, 2015), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf (detailing the ultrasound 
requirements in various states, three of which resemble the North Carolina provision that was 
struck down); see also Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Case on Pre-Abortion 
Ultrasounds, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2015, at A16 (noting that North Carolina was one of five 
states where the provider was required to display and describe the ultrasound image to the 
woman seeking an abortion). 
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irrespective of whether the woman wanted to know this information.86 
In Stuart v. Camnitz, the Fourth Circuit heard this challenge, striking 
down this mandatory ultrasound requirement as compelled speech for 
providers; North Carolina’s subsequent Petition for Certiorari was 
denied.87  The current cases pending certiorari review will test the 
strength of the undue burden standard to determine whether women 
can actually access their fundamental right to abortion.88 
B. What Have Courts Said about the Denial of Abortion Services as 
Sex Discrimination? 
The prevailing view for how abortion has been protected within 
US jurisprudence has been through the liberty right under the Due 
Process Clause. 89  With few exceptions, the US legal system has 
declined to recognize the denial of abortion access as sex 
discrimination per se.90 This section will review historical approaches 
to Equal Protection jurisprudence with a particular focus on when 
discrimination on the basis of sex can be triggered. 
Facing discrimination as a result of pregnancy is an experience 
that only a woman could have, and therefore constitutes sex 
discrimination. 91  To quote Justice Ginsburg, “[i]t was always 
                                                                                                             
86. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2014) (cert. denied) (describing that 
the physician is required to administer and describe the ultrasound, even if the woman does not 
wish to see or hear about the fetus); see also Liptak, supra note 85 (stating that twenty-four 
states have pre-abortion ultrasound requirements and five states had similar regulations to 
North Carolina’s unconstitutional version). 
87. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 256 (“Transforming the physician into the mouthpiece of the state 
undermines the trust that is necessary for facilitating healthy doctor-patient relationships and, 
through them, successful treatment outcomes.”); see also Liptak, supra note 85 (describing the 
Court’s standard one sentence order for the rejection of certiorari review). 
88. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 72, at *2, *13-*17 (arguing that the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision constituted an undue burden in violation of the Due Process Clause); 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari: Brief in Opposition, Docket No. 14-997 (Apr. 21, 2015), 
Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 448 (5th Cir. 2014) (filing a response 
to the petition on behalf of Jackson Women’s Health Organization). 
89. See supra Part I.A. 
90. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54, 162-64 (1973) (deciding that a woman’s 
right to choose an abortion was protected under the Due Process Clause); Planned Parenthood 
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-79 (1992) (upholding the central tenet of Roe, 
determining that a woman’s right to choose was protected until viability under the undue 
burden standard). 
91. See generally Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg on Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. 771 (2010) 
(analyzing now Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s arguments for why pregnancy discrimination 
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recognition that one thing that conspicuously distinguishes women 
from men is that only women become pregnant; and if you subject a 
woman to disadvantageous treatment on the basis of her pregnant 
status . . . you would be denying her equal treatment under the 
law.” 92  Yet, the Supreme Court in Geduldig v. Aiello disagreed, 
holding that pregnancy-related discrimination did not constitute sex 
discrimination; as a result, the Equal Protection Clause has largely 
been viewed as an unreliable avenue for protecting abortion-related 
rights. 93  In Geduldig, the Court reviewed a California disability 
statute where pregnancy-related disabilities were ineligible for 
coverage under the state insurance scheme and held that this 
prohibition did not constitute sex discrimination, despite the fact that 
pregnancy is a condition that only women can experience. 94 
Subsequently, Geduldig’s reasoning was applied in General Electric 
v. Gilbert, where the Court held that the denial of pregnancy-related 
disabilities under a disability plan was not a violation of the Civil 
Rights Act. 95  The Pregnancy Discrimination Act was passed in 
Congress in response to Geduldig and Gilbert’s restrictive holdings, 
yet its application is limited in that it only applies to employment 
                                                                                                             
constitutes sex discrimination); Diane L. Zimmerman, Comment: Geduldig v. Aiello: 
Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 441 
(1975) (describing how the Geduldig Court failed to recognize the differential impact that 
pregnancy and other gender-specific characteristics have on women). 
92 . See Siegel & Siegel, supra note 91, at 771 (citing Nomination of Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 206 (1993) (statement of Judge Ginsburg)). 
93. See id. at 791 (noting that the sex discrimination and abortion jurisprudence have 
developed in isolation from one another). See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts 
on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985) (noting 
Roe’s shortcomings by not deciding the case on sex equality grounds). 
94. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 493-97 (1974) (holding that pregnancy related 
disabilities are not eligible for coverage and accordingly do not constitute a violation of Equal 
Protection); see also id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Such dissimilar treatment of men 
and women, on the basis of physical characteristics inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably 
constitutes sex discrimination.”). 
95. See General Electric Co v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976) (describing that denial 
of pregnancy-related disability benefits does not violate Equal Protection); Siegel & Siegel, 
supra note 91, at 772 n.8 (explaining how Geduldig’s reasoning was applied in Gilbert); see 
also Daniela M. de la Piedra, Flirting with the PDA: Congress Must Give Birth to 
Accommodation Rights that Protect Pregnant Working Women, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
275, 279-80 (2008) (describing Gilbert’s holding that there are no risks that men are protected 
from that women are not and no risks that women are protected from that men are not, 
therefore not violating Equal Protection doctrine). 
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settings.96 Sex discrimination in employment settings is defined to 
include discrimination that occurs: 
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, 
or related medical conditions shall be treated  the same for all 
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under 
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but 
similar in their ability or inability to work. . . .97 
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act also specifies that prohibiting 
pregnancy discrimination does not require or preclude employers 
from paying for abortions, except in the necessary case when carrying 
the fetus to term would endanger the mother’s life. 98  Women’s 
childbearing capabilities have historically resulted in their 
“disadvantaged treatment” and discrimination. 99  Although the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act partially corrects for the pregnancy-
based discrimination, it is limited to employment settings, which is 
only a small subset of the ways in which women experience 
pregnancy-based discrimination.100 Despite Equal Protection language 
that would seem to support the provision of abortion rights, the 
scepter of Geduldig still looms large.101 Although prior gender-related 
                                                                                                             
96 . Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978) (providing that 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in employment contexts is unlawful); see also Siegel 
& Siegel, supra note 91, at 772 n.8 (“Congress responded by enacting the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Amendment to Title VII (PDA), which defines discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy as discrimination on the basis of sex.”). 
97 . Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978) (establishing the 
grounds for pregnancy discrimination and statutorily rejecting Geduldig and Gilbert in 
employment contexts). 
98. Id. (ensuring critical protections for the woman’s health). See generally de la Piedra, 
supra note 95 (critiquing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s functionality in limiting 
discrimination in employment settings). 
99. See Siegel & Siegel, supra note 91, at 783 (citing Brief for the Petitioner, Struck v. 
Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 72-178), 1972 WL 135840); see also John C. 
Gibson, Childbearing and Childrearing: Feminists and Reform, 73 VA. L.R. 1175, 1175 
(1987) (describing the slow pace of reform for pregnancy-related policies due to the perception 
of women as child-rearers). 
100. See e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 93, at 375-86 (describing the importance of applying 
the equality framework to address pregnancy-related issues, including the abortion question). 
See generally de la Piedra, supra note 95 (discussing the limits of the application of the PDA). 
101. See Julie F. Kay, Note: If Men Could Get Pregnant: An Equal Protection Model for 
Federal Funding of Abortion Under a National Health Care Plan, 60 BROOKLYN L. REV. 349, 
377-80 (1994) (noting the Court’s denial to recognize that regulations affecting pregnant 
women affect women as a class); see also Zimmerman, supra note 91, at 461-62 (highlighting 
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Equal Protection cases had applied some heightened standard of 
scrutiny to gender-based classifications, the Geduldig Court’s 
decision not to recognize pregnancy as a sex-based trait necessarily 
sits in tension with these cases.102 
Applying the Equal Protection doctrine to abortion jurisprudence 
is also limited by the principle that only facial, de jure discrimination 
is unconstitutional. 103  Washington v. Davis is the key case in 
analyzing discriminatory effect in the Equal Protection context, where 
the Court explicitly limited the applicability of the Equal Protection 
Clause to facial, de jure discrimination rather than expanding its 
scope to include the prohibition of de facto discrimination.104 The 
Equal Protection Clause seeks to prevent discrimination in official 
conduct. 105  In Davis, a police officers’ entrance examination 
disproportionately precluded African-American applicants from 
joining the police force.106 However, the Court held that where there 
is not a clear, invidious discriminatory purpose and there is only a 
                                                                                                             
the role that sex stereotyping played in the Geduldig decision and the problematic impact that 
it has on women). 
102. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677, 687-91 (1973) (describing that classifications on the basis of sex must be evaluated 
under a strict scrutiny standard of review), with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971) 
(noting that the Equal Protection clause prohibits different treatment to a class of people that is 
not related to the purpose of the statute and stating that the statute’s default male preference 
was arbitrary and unsupportable); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 227-28 (1976) (establishing 
that the rational-basis test is the appropriate level of scrutiny for the gender-based 
classification); and United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-34 (1996) (requiring the State 
to show that the gender-based classifications are serving important governmental objectives 
for which the classification is substantially related to the achievement of these aims). 
103. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237 (1976) (noting the disproportionately 
higher failure rate among black applicants over white applicants); see also Robert C. Power, 
The Wire and Alternative Stories of Law and Inequality, 46 IND. L. REV 425, 441 (2013) 
(explaining the role of “discriminatory effect” as a non-dispositive factor in the Court’s 
analysis of an action’s constitutionality). 
104. Because Washington v. Davis dealt with the Washington D.C. police force and a 
federally administered test, this Equal Protection challenge was based on the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause claim established through Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). See 
Davis, 426 U.S. at 239; see also Bolling, 347 U.S. at 498-99 (stating that the Equal Protection 
Clause also pertains to the actions of the federal government through the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause). 
105. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239. 
106. Id. at 237 (stating that black applicants were four times as likely to fail the police 
examination as white applicants); see also Power, supra note 103, at 441 (describing the 
Court’s holding in Washington v. Davis that discriminatory impact is relevant yet insufficient 
to declare an action unconstitutional). 
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discriminatory effect, this racially discriminatory impact provided 
insufficient grounds to hold the law or action unconstitutional. 107 
Explaining its rationale, the Davis court stated that 
“[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole 
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the 
Constitution.” 108 Heightened classification requirements for 
historically marginalized populations are critical for ensuring that 
discriminatory statutes are held invalid, yet the clear purpose 
requirement indicates that fewer laws or official actions will be 
declared unconstitutional.109 This discriminatory purpose requirement 
has been used to screen out various potential claims by protected 
classes, since proving purpose is a high barrier.110 
C. Liberty and Equality: The Due Process Clause and Equal 
Protection Doctrine Working in Tandem 
This section will review ways in which the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses have been used together to uphold certain 
fundamental rights, which have not frequently been applied in the 
context of abortion access. Recently, Obergefell v. Hodges struck 
down remaining prohibitions on same-sex marriage, emphasizing the 
connection between liberty and equality.111 Even before Obergefell, 
this relationship was articulated in Justice Stevens’ dissent in Bowers 
v. Hardwick, where he highlighted the unique relationship between 
Due Process liberty interests and Equal Protection: “[a]lthough the 
                                                                                                             
107. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239 (noting that the Equal Protection clause intends to address 
invidious discrimination between groups); see also Power, supra note 103, at 441 (describing 
the requirement of a clear discriminatory purpose). 
108. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. 
109. Id. (stating that the rule that “racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest 
scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations” is not triggered in this 
case); see also Power, supra note 103, at 441-42 (noting the difficulty in producing sufficient 
evidence to prove discriminatory purpose since the intention is often well-hidden). 
110. See Kay, supra note 101, at 385 (describing how the purpose requirement within the 
equal protection analysis has the impact of limiting these challenges). See generally Sylvia A. 
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984) (providing a critical 
analysis of the sex equality jurisprudence arguing for an increased emphasis on the purpose 
and impact of actions and that current Constitutional protections do not sufficiently emphasize 
biological differences between men and women). 
111 . Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___, *19-22 (2015) (describing that the Due 
Process clause and Equal Protection clauses work in complementarity to protect fundamental 
rights). See generally Farrell, supra note 32 (describing the unclear delineation when applying 
the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause to protect fundamental rights). 
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meaning of the principle that ‘all men are created equal’ is not always 
clear, it surely must mean that every free citizen has the same interest 
in ‘liberty’ that the members of the majority share.”112 Obergefell 
relied in part upon Loving v. Virginia as guiding precedent on the 
illustrative relationship that exists between the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses to determine when there are fundamental rights at 
stake.113 “The equal protection analysis depended in central part on 
the Court’s holding that the law burdened a right ‘of fundamental 
importance.’ . . . Each concept—liberty and equal protection—leads 
to a stronger understanding of the other.”114 Rather than just acting as 
a bellwether for potential fundamental rights violations, “the Equal 
Protection Clause can help to identify and correct inequalities . . . 
vindicating precepts of liberty and equality under the Constitution.”115 
The Obergefell Court’s approach could be squarely applied to address 
another fundamental right, the right to decide whether or when to 
have children, in part since these same key constitutional concepts of 
liberty and equality are rooted in the Court’s decisions in Griswold 
and Eisenstadt.116 Whole Woman’s Health may open the door to a 
new approach to reviewing abortion restrictions through a composite 
Due Process and Equal Protection analysis, which will be discussed in 
Part III.117 
                                                                                                             
112. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 218 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that 
all individuals have the same interests in liberty and should equally receive protections against 
government intrusion); see also Farrell, supra note 32, at 226-32 (describing that the equal 
protection clause has been also used to identify fundamental rights at issue, in addition to the 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and “history and traditions” tests). 
113. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at *20 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1965) “To 
deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications 
embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at 
the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty 
without due process of law.”); see also Farrell, supra note 32, at 247-48 (concluding that the 
Court has developed separate tests for fundamental rights under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses, but often views them as interchangeable when it sees fit). 
114. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 20 (illustrating how liberty and equality help to understand 
the fundamental importance of certain rights); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) 
(grounding the liberty right to decide whether or when to bear children in the equality context 
of single and married people alike being able to make this choice); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (explaining how the penumbras in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Ninth Amendments ground the right to privacy protections in the Due Process clause as a 
fundamental right). 
115. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 21. 
116. Id. 
117. See infra Part III.A.1. 
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II. NORTHERN IRELAND’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS 
ABORTION 
Northern Ireland’s sui generis political system has enabled it to 
maintain a more restrictive approach to abortion than other 
jurisdictions in the United Kingdom. 118  First, this section will 
introduce the current legal framework in Northern Ireland, and then 
will discuss current European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence 
on abortion under the European Convention of Human Rights. 
Finally, this section will conclude by analyzing the stigmatizing 
impact that abortion criminalization has on women as well as how 
this encourages women to seek out unsafe methods to terminate 
unwanted pregnancies. 
 
A. Northern Ireland’s Current Legal Landscape, Generally and as 
Applied to Abortion 
This section will introduce Northern Ireland’s (1) government 
structure; (2) the current statutes, regulatory guidelines, and case law 
that frame the legal status of abortion; and (3) the legal challenge to 
the jurisdiction-based abortion coverage through the National Health 
Service (“NHS”). 
1. Quasi-Autonomous, but Still a United Kingdom Jurisdiction  
Conflict in Northern Ireland, known as “The Troubles,” raged 
for roughly forty years over whether Northern Ireland would remain a 
part of the United Kingdom or join the Republic of Ireland; the 1998 
Good Friday Agreement laid the foundation for peace in Northern 
Ireland, establishing a right to self-determination.119 The Good Friday 
                                                                                                             
118. See infra Part II.A.1-2 (describing the structure of Northern Ireland’s government). 
119.  Agreement Reached in Multi-Party Negotiations, Dublin, Belfast, London, arts. 
1(i)-(iv), Apr. 10, 1998 [hereinafter Good Friday Agreement, (providing for Northern Ireland 
to choose to remain a part of the United Kingdom or join the Republic of Ireland); see also 
Dealing with Northern Ireland’s Past: Towards a Transitional Justice Approach, Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Commission (July 2013), http://www.nihrc.org/uploads/publications/
NIHRC_Transitional_Justice_Report.pdf (providing a transitional justice framework to 
address longstanding conflict in Northern Ireland); Ari Shapiro, For Northern Ireland, Wounds 
from ‘The Troubles’ Are Still Raw, NPR (Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/
parallels/2014/11/28/367183005/for-northern-ireland-wounds-from-the-troubles-are-still-raw 
(stating how communities are still impacted by the forty years of conflict). 
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Agreement also required the establishment of the Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission (“NIHRC”) to advise the Secretary of 
State on the development of a Bill of Rights.120 Subsequently, the St. 
Andrews Agreement in 2006 provided a framework for a semi-
autonomous government for Northern Ireland, indicated that it would 
remain a United Kingdom jurisdiction with future possibilities for 
self-determination, and reiterated the call for the establishment of a 
Northern Irish Bill of Rights.121 The Human Rights Act of 1998 gave 
legal effect to the rights contained within the European Convention on 
Human Rights within the United Kingdom. 122  Furthermore, the 
Human Rights Act stipulated that the United Kingdom courts are 
required to take into account European Court of Human Rights 
decisions, judgments, or advisory opinions when Convention rights 
are raised in the Courts.123 
                                                                                                             
120 . See Good Friday Agreement, supra note 119, Strand One, Safeguards, § 5(b) 
(noting the establishment of a Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission aligned with the 
European Convention of Human Rights); id. at Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of 
Opportunity, §§ 2-4 (noting the incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights 
into domestic law, the establishment of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, and 
the incorporation of equality principles, including on the basis of gender); see also Anne 
Smith, Internationalisation and Constitutional Borrowing in Drafting Bills of Rights, 60(4) 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 867, 875 (2011) (discussing the NIHRC’s responsibility for the 
development of a Bill of Rights in Northern Ireland). 
121 . See St. Andrews Agreement, 2006, §§ 2-3, Annexes A-B (noting the semi-
autonomous nature of Northern Ireland’s government and its obligations to follow the 
European Convention on Human Rights). See generally A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: 
Advice to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMMISSION (Dec. 10, 2008) http://www.nihrc.org/uploads/publications/bill-of-rights-for-
northern-ireland-advice-to-secretary-state-2008.pdf [hereinafter 2008 NIHRC Guidance on the 
Bill of Rights] (describing the process of attempting to establish a Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland). 
122 . See About Human Rights, NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, 
http://www.nihrc.org/about-human-rights [hereinafter NIHRC, About Human Rights] (stating 
that the Human Rights Act gives legal effect of ECHR rights and freedoms contained in the 
Convention). But see 2008 NIHRC Guidance on the Bill of Rights, supra note 121, at 9 
(noting that the Human Rights Act only signs onto the body of the Convention and not its 
protocols and stating that all of the United Kingdom jurisdictions would need to sign onto the 
protocol jointly). 
123 . See Human Rights Act, 1998, art. 2(1)(a) (stating that challenges involving 
Convention rights require consideration of existing jurisprudence from the European Court of 
Human Rights); see also NIHRC, About Human Rights, supra note 122 (describing the 
Convention rights that are protected, including the right to respect for one’s private and family 
life and the right to non-discrimination). 
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2. Particular Circumstances for Northern Ireland?: The Legal 
Framework for Abortion 
Access to abortion within Northern Ireland remains severely 
restricted since the Abortion Act of 1967’s coverage within the 
United Kingdom does not extend to Northern Ireland.124 The Abortion 
Act of 1967 permits abortion if the woman is not more than twenty-
four weeks pregnant, if there is risk of physical or mental injury to the 
woman or her family, a risk of permanent injuries to the woman, 
better health outcomes if the woman terminates her pregnancy, or is 
carrying a fetus with physical or mental abnormalities.125 However, 
Northern Ireland still follows the United Kingdom’s legal framework 
that preceded the passage of the Abortion Act of 1967.126 As such, a 
woman in Northern Ireland is not able to obtain an abortion other than 
to preserve her life when there are risks to her physical and mental 
health, where these health risks must be either permanent or long-
term and serious, such as an imminent risk of death to the mother.127 
                                                                                                             
124. See The World’s Abortion Laws: Northern Ireland, CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS 
(2015), http://worldabortionlaws.com/map/ (indicating that abortion is only permitted to 
protect a woman’s mental health). See generally Northern Ireland: Barriers to Accessing 
Abortion Services, supra note 18 (describing the barriers that women in Northern Ireland face 
to access abortion services). 
125. See Abortion Act 1967, c. 87, §§ 1, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1967/87/
contents (“Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an offence 
under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical 
practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith—
(a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance of the 
pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the 
physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family; or (b) 
that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental 
health of the pregnant woman; or (c) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk 
to the life of the pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or (d) that 
there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or 
mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped”). The entirety of the Abortion Act 1967 
does not apply to Northern Ireland. Id. § 7(3); see also id. § 1(1) (noting that the provisions of 
the 1967 Abortion Act reflect the amendments made by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990). 
126. See Rex v. Bourne [1939] 1 K. B. 687 (decriminalizing abortion when preserving 
the life of the mother); see also Offences against the Person Act, 1861, §§ 58-59 (N. Ir.) 
(establishing that abortion is criminalized and anyone who induces a miscarriage is guilty of a 
felony or misdemeanor, depending on the scope of offense). 
127. Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland in Family Planning Association of Northern 
Ireland v. Minister For Health and Social Services and Public Safety, [2004] NICA 37, [12]. 
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The Offences against the Person Act of 1861 provides the 
foundation for criminalizing inducing an abortion by criminalizing 
a woman who attempts to or successfully procures an abortion with 
felony or misdemeanor charges.128 
Every woman, being with child, who, with intent to procure her 
own miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any 
poison or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use  any 
instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, and 
whosoever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, 
whether she be or be not with child, shall unlawfully administer 
to her or cause to be taken by her any poison or other noxious 
thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means 
whatsoever with the like intent, shall be guilty of felony, and 
being convicted thereof shall be liable . . . to be kept in penal 
servitude for life. . . .129 
Unlawfully supplying medicines or instruments knowing that they 
will be used for the purpose of inducing abortion is a misdemeanor 
offense under the Offences Against the Person Act.130 
Rex v. Bourne narrowed the application of the Offences Against 
the Person Act, stating that “[n]o person ought to be convicted under s. 
58 of the Act of 1861 unless the jury are satisfied the act was not done 
in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the 
mother.”131 Therefore, if an abortion is performed for the good faith 
purpose of preserving the pregnant woman’s life, the woman would 
                                                                                                             
128. Offences against the Person Act, 1861, §§ 58-59 (N. Ir.) (noting that the woman 
who seeks to obtain a miscarriage is guilty of a felony, and a provider who assists her is guilty 
of a misdemeanor); see also Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, 
Guidance on the Termination of Pregnancy: The Law and Clinical Practice in Northern Ireland 
§ 2.2 n.1 (July 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Northern Ireland Termination of Pregnancy Guidance] 
(describing the Offence against the Person Act as a key component of the law with respect to 
pregnancy termination in Northern Ireland). 
129. Offences against the Person Act, 1861, § 58 (N. Ir.). 
130. Id. (targeting providers who might help a woman to obtain abortion services); see 
also 2008 Northern Ireland Termination of Pregnancy Guidance, supra note 128, § 2.2 n.1 
(determining that the Offences against the Person Act is in effect and criminalizes women and 
providers who receive or perform abortions outside of the legally authorized circumstances). 
131. Rex v. Bourne [1939] 1 K. B. 687 (placing the burden on the state to prove that 
obtaining an abortion was not for the purpose of preserving the life of the mother in good 
faith); see also 2008 Northern Ireland Termination of Pregnancy Guidance, supra note 128, § 
2.2 n.1 (noting the consistent application of the Bourne decision in Northern Irish cases). 
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no longer be subject to criminal liability.132 The Criminal Justice Act 
of Northern Ireland of 1945 further criminalized abortion when a 
child would be capable of being born alive—including a provision 
that a woman who is twenty-eight weeks pregnant would meet the 
prima facie evidentiary requirement—only dischargeable in the good 
faith instance of the preservation of the life of the mother.133 
Subsequent abortion-related jurisprudence in Northern Ireland 
has predominantly centered on defining the scope of when abortion is 
permitted within the context of the threat to a woman’s physical or 
mental health by continuation of the pregnancy. 134  In Family 
Planning Association for Northern Ireland v. Minister for Health, 
Social Services and Public Safety, the Court requested the 
development of guidelines to clarify the circumstances in which 
providers would be able to lawfully perform abortions. 135  As 
stipulated in Family Planning Association for Northern Ireland, the 
guidelines expanded upon the mandate that abortions are permitted 
when the continuation of pregnancy would put a woman’s physical or 
mental health at risk with an adverse effect that is “real and serious” 
as well as “permanent or long-term.”136  These current regulations 
                                                                                                             
132. Offences against the Person Act, 1861, §§ 58, 59 (N. Ir.) (criminalizing abortion for 
every woman who intends to procure her own abortion and providers who help women to 
obtain abortions); Rex v. Bourne [1939] 1 K. B. 687 (requiring the state to prove that obtaining 
an abortion was not for the purpose of preserving the life of the mother in good faith). 
133 . Criminal Justice Act, § 25 (1945) (N. Ir.) (describing the offense of child 
destruction for when a child is capable of being born alive); see also 2008 Northern Ireland 
Termination of Pregnancy Guidance, supra note 128, § 2.2 n.1 (noting that the Criminal 
Justice Act of 1945 should be read in conjunction with the Offences against the Person Act and 
Rex v. Bourne). 
134. See 2008 Northern Ireland Termination of Pregnancy Guidance, supra note 128, 
Annex A, ¶¶ 7-13 (citing influential cases after 1993); see also Eileen V. Fegan & Rachel 
Rebouche, Northern Ireland’s Abortion Law: The Morality of Silence and the Censure of 
Agency, 11 FEMINIST LEGAL STUDIES 221, 228 (2003) (describing the series of unreported 
cases, including Re K, Re A.M.N.H., and Re S.J.B., that established that the risk needed to be 
real, serious, and long term to qualify for the mental health exception). 
135. Family Planning Association for Northern Ireland v. Minister for Health, Social 
Services and Public Safety, ¶¶ 5, 9-10, 12 [2004] (describing the necessity of the development 
of guidelines to medical professionals for practices related to the termination of pregnancy); 
see also 2008 Northern Ireland Termination of Pregnancy Guidance, supra note 128, Annex 
A, ¶ 13 (referencing the order to develop legal guidelines on the termination of pregnancy). 
136. See 2008 Northern Ireland Termination of Pregnancy Guidance, supra note 128, ¶ 
3.2 (explaining that real, serious, and long-term mental health effects are rare and must be 
assessed by a medical professional); see also Family Planning Association for Northern 
Ireland v. Minister for Health, Social Services and Public Safety, ¶ 12 [2004] (suggesting 
principles that should be included in the development of abortion guidelines). 
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limit the scope of the situations in which an abortion would be 
lawfully permitted to occur.137 
In 2013, the Department of Health, Social Services and Public 
Safety also held a consultation to clarify the circumstances within the 
existing legal framework in which abortion should be permitted.138 
Within the context of preserving the life or physical or mental health 
of the pregnant woman, the consultation focused on the mental health 
grounds, doctor certification, conscience-based refusals to pregnancy 
termination, counseling requirements, patient confidentiality, and 
human rights concerns. 139  The Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission applied for judicial review (“NIHRC Judicial Review”) 
to determine whether the legal framework—the Offences against the 
Person Act of 1861 and the Criminal Justice Act of 1945—can be 
read to be consistent with the European Convention on Human 
Rights.140 In a pair of decisions in 2015, the High Court of Northern 
Ireland held that the current legal framework is not Convention-
compliant in instances of fatal fetal abnormality or sexual crimes, but 
                                                                                                             
137 . See Family Planning Association for Northern Ireland v. Minister for Health, 
Social Services and Public Safety, ¶ 12 [2004] (noting that a probability, and sometimes a 
possibility, of a woman’s imminent death would be permissible grounds for termination); see 
also 2008 Northern Ireland Termination of Pregnancy Guidance, supra note 128, ¶ 3.2 
(stating that the instances of real, serious, and long-term mental health consequences from 
pregnancy are likely to be rare). 
138. See Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, Draft Termination of 
Pregnancy Guidance Summary of Consultation Responses Received, 2 (Oct. 2013), https://
www.dhsspsni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/consultations/dhssps/termination-pregnancy-responses
-2013.pdf [hereinafter DHSSPS Summary of Pregnancy Termination Guidance Consultation] 
(seeking guidance within the existing legal framework where it is unlawful to terminate a 
pregnancy “unless it is necessary to preserve the life of a pregnant woman, or there is a risk of 
real and serious adverse effect on her physical or mental health, which is either long term or 
permanent”); see also Family Planning Association for Northern Ireland v. Minister for 
Health, Social Services and Public Safety, ¶ 12 [2004] (describing the circumstances in which 
the risk of a woman’s imminent death would be permissible grounds for termination). 
139. See DHSSPS Summary of Pregnancy Termination Guidance Consultation, supra 
note 138 (detailing the issues raised within the consultation and the arguments presented by 
each respondent); Committee for Health, Social Services and Public Safety, Official Report: 
Guidance on Termination of Pregnancy in Northern Ireland: DHSSPS (Oct. 22, 2013) 
(briefing the Northern Ireland Assembly on the outcomes of the consultation process on the 
guidance document). 
140. Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for Judicial Review, 
[2015] NIQB 96, 2015 WL 8131461 (describing that Northern Ireland’s legal framework on 
abortion cannot be read to be Convention-compliant in instances of fatal fetal abnormality and 
instances of rape and incest); Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for 
Judicial Review, ¶¶ 4-5 [2015] NIQB 102, 2015 WL 9112625 (confirming that there is no 
possible construction of the current legal framework to interpret it as Convention-compliant).  
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does not compel the legislature to implement this change 
statutorily.141   
3. Northern Irish Women Are Able to Travel to Other Parts of the 
United Kingdom to Obtain a Safe Abortion 
Within the United Kingdom, the National Health Service Act of 
2006 provides a comprehensive health care system free of charge, 
including access to abortion in certain circumstances. 142  Each 
jurisdiction within the United Kingdom has also created its own 
coverage requirements. 143  Because of the more permissive legal 
framework to access abortions in other parts of the United Kingdom, 
in 2011, NHS documented that there were 1,007 women from 
Northern Ireland that sought abortion services in hospitals and clinics 
in England, mostly “in fee charging independent private clinics.”144 
Alliance for Choice as an intervener suggests that the actual figure is 
                                                                                                             
141. See Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for Judicial Review, 
[2015] NIQB 96, 2015 WL 8131461 (holding that in instances of fatal fetal abnormality and 
instances of rape and incest, Northern Ireland’s legal framework on abortion cannot be read to 
be Convention-compliant); Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for 
Judicial Review, ¶¶ 3-5 [2015] NIQB 102, 2015 WL 9112625 (determining that there is not 
any possible construction of the current legal framework to interpret it as Convention-
compliant, but cabining this interpretation as provisional for other courts, a referendum, or 
legislature to decide); Douglas Dalby, Judge Leaves Northern Ireland’s Abortion Laws to 
Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2015, at A18 (stating that Judge Horner did not order 
exceptions in the instances of fatal fetal abnormality or sexual crimes as ‘“a step too far’”); see 
also infra Part II.B for a discussion on the court’s interpretation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights.   
142. See National Health Service Act 2006, c. 41, § 1(3) (noting that the health services 
must be provided free of charge, except in certain exceptional circumstances); see also R. (on 
the application of A) v. Secretary of State for Health, [2014] EWHC 1364 (Admin), [23], 2014 
WL 1220042 (citing that National Health Service Act, 2006 §§ 3(1)(c)-(d) are usually 
interpreted as coverage for legal abortions). 
143. See National Health Service Act, 2006, c. 41, § 3(1)(d), 6 (stating that possibility of 
providing any service that NHS provides in England in other jurisdictions, including “such 
other services or facilities for the care of pregnant women . . . as he considers are appropriate 
as part of the health service”); see also R. (on the application of A), [2014] EWHC 1364 
(Admin.), ¶¶ 35-36 (noting the different available health care services by United Kingdom 
jurisdiction as a result of the residence-based system). 
144.  R. (on the application of A), [2014] EWHC 1364 (Admin.), ¶¶ 9, 14 (noting that 
only five abortions were provided free of charge in England); Abortion Act 1967, § 1 
(permitting women up to twenty-four weeks pregnant to obtain an abortion if continuing the 
pregnancy would pose physical or mental health risks or in the case of fetal impairment). 
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likely closer to 2,000 women per year.145 In R (on the Application of 
A) v. Secretary of State for Health (hereinafter “R”), the Court 
reviewed whether Northern Irish women should be able to access free 
abortion services through NHS.146 The lower court held that Northern 
Irish women should not be allowed to access free abortions in other 
United Kingdom jurisdictions, because of the reasonableness of a 
residence-based health care system, which was upheld on appeal.147 
Although women are allowed to go to England to obtain legal 
abortions, citizens of Northern Ireland cannot access free abortions 
through NHS as is possible in the other United Kingdom 
jurisdictions.148 The R court upheld the NHS’ express policy, which 
states “that in general the NHS should not fund services for residents 
of Northern Ireland which the Northern Ireland assembly has 
deliberately decided not to legislate to provide, and which would be 
unlawful if provided in Northern Ireland.”149 Therefore, since there is 
no access to state-funded abortion services, Northern Irish women are 
required to pay out of pocket for their flights to jurisdictions where 
                                                                                                             
145. R. (on the Application of A) v. Secretary of State for Health, C1/2014/1687 [2015] 
EWCA Civ. 771, [2], 2015 WL 4401470 (stating that Alliance for Choice as intervener 
suggests that the actual figure of Northern Irish women seeking abortions in England is double 
the official figure); Northern Ireland: Barriers to Accessing Abortion Services, supra note 18 
(describing that many Northern Irish women seeking abortions in other jurisdictions give false 
addresses for fear of criminal sanctions). 
146.  R. (on the application of A), [2014] EWHC 1364 (Admin.), ¶¶ 2, 35-36 (describing 
the legal challenge querying whether a Northern Irish resident present in England can access 
free abortion services through NHS); see also Northern Ireland: Barriers to Accessing 
Abortion Services, supra note 18, at 17-18 (describing the Court’s decision to deny Northern 
Irish women NHS coverage for abortion services and the problematic financial impact that the 
travel requirement to obtain abortion services imposes). 
147.  R. (on the application of A), [2014] EWHC 1364 (Admin.), ¶ 57 (deferring to the 
authority within each jurisdiction to determine coverage limits); R. (on the Application of A), 
[2015] EWCA Civ. 771, ¶ 16 (holding that NHS cannot provide services to someone 
“temporarily present” in that jurisdiction). 
148. See National Health Service Act 2006, c. 41, § 3(1)(d), 6 (stating that possibility of 
providing any service that NHS provides in England in other jurisdictions, including “such 
other services or facilities for the care of pregnant women . . . as he considers are appropriate 
as part of the health service”); see also Abortion Act 1967, ¶ 7(3) (noting that the provisions of 
the Abortion Act 1967 do not extend to Northern Ireland). 
149. Compare R. (on the application of A), [2014] EWHC 1364 (Admin.), ¶ 58 (holding 
the lawfulness of the exclusion of abortion services from Northern Irish women), with 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations: 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶ 50, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/GBR/CO/7 (2013) (stating that the limit on abortion services within Northern 
Ireland “mak[es] it necessary for women to seek abortions in other parts of the State party”). 
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abortions are provided as well as for the procedure itself; for example, 
plaintiff in R paid GB£600 (equivalent to US$909) for the procedure 
and roughly GB£300 (equivalent to US$454) in travel costs.150 These 
costs can be prohibitively expensive and may preclude individuals 
from seeking safe abortions.151 R’s holding does not bar Northern 
Irish women from continuing to travel to fee charging, independent 
clinics in other parts of the United Kingdom since the complaint 
focuses on accessing abortion services without a fee.152 
On appeal, the court upheld the jurisdictional distinctions to 
protect the Northern Ireland government’s choice to follow the pre-
1967 Abortion Act legal framework and dismissed public law and 
European Convention on Human Rights arguments for a protected 
abortion right within Northern Ireland. 153  In particular, appellants 
argue that the European Convention on Human Rights protects the 
right to obtain an abortion through the right to respect for private and 
family life (Article 8) and the prohibition on discrimination (Article 
14).154 R also invokes a larger question, which is whether it is lawful 
to fully cover abortion services for some United Kingdom citizens 
                                                                                                             
150.  R. (on the application of A), [2014] EWHC 1364 (Admin.), ¶ 10; see also British 
Pound to US Dollar Rate, XE.COM (last visited Jan. 11, 2016) (converting to the U.S. Dollar 
based on October 1, 2015 exchange rates). 
151. Northern Ireland: Barriers to Accessing Abortion Services, supra note 18, 17-18; 
The Northern Ireland Poverty Bulletin 2013/14 Is Released, DEPARTMENT FOR SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT (June 25, 2015), https://www.dsdni.gov.uk/news/northern-ireland-poverty-
bulletin-201314-released (stating the median weekly household income as GB£404 and 
poverty rates increased to 21 percent of Northern Irish individuals). 
152.  Compare R. (on the application of A), [2014] EWHC 1364 (Admin.), ¶¶ 3-5, with 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations: 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶ 50, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/GBR/CO/7 (2013) (noting that Northern Irish women are required to travel to 
other parts of the United Kingdom to access abortion services). 
153.  R. (on the Application of A), [2015] EWCA Civ. 771, ¶¶ 16, 21-39 (noting that 
Article 8, the right to respect for privacy and family life, and Article 14, the prohibition on 
discrimination, are not violated by the denial of access to abortion services); see also European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 8, 14, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR] (establishing the right to respect for privacy and 
family life and non-discrimination). 
154 . See infra Part II.B (discussing the application of the European Convention on 
Human Rights to Northern Ireland); see also ECHR, supra note 153, arts. 8, 14 (protecting the 
right to respect for privacy and family life and non-discrimination). 
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and deny access to those services altogether for other United 
Kingdom citizens.155 
B. European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence: Friend or Foe? 
Since the Human Rights Act of 1998 gave domestic effect to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the Northern Irish Courts are 
required to respect, protect, and fulfill these rights within their 
borders.156 Of particular concern in European Court of Human Rights 
jurisprudence in the abortion context are Articles 3, 8, and 14.157 
Within the High Court of Northern Ireland’s recent NIHRC Judicial 
Review, the court analyzed whether Northern Ireland’s legal 
framework on abortion could be interpreted to be consistent with the 
relevant European Convention rights.158 
Article 3 states that “[n]o one should be subjected to. . . 
inhuman or degrading treatment. . . .” 159  Inhuman or degrading 
treatment does not meet the threshold of torture, and is set at 
deliberate inhuman treatment that causes cruel and serious 
suffering.160 The European Court of Human Rights has stated that the 
                                                                                                             
155. See infra Part III.B (discussing the implications of unequal protection of the laws by 
jurisdiction); Northern Ireland: Barriers to Accessing Abortion Services, supra note 18, at 40-
41 (noting the harms of a postcode lottery, where access to services differs from one NHS 
Trust to another). 
156 . See Human Rights Act, 1998, art. 2(1)(a) (noting that challenges involving 
Convention rights require consideration of existing jurisprudence from the European Court of 
Human Rights); see also NIHRC, About Human Rights, supra note 122, at 25 (describing the 
European Convention rights that are protected). 
157. ECHR, supra note 153, arts. 3, 8, 14 (protecting the right to be free from cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment, the right to respect for private and family life, and non-
discrimination). See generally European Court of Human Rights, Reproductive Rights Fact 
Sheet: Access to a Lawful Abortion (July 2015), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_
Reproductive_ENG.pdf (discussing the application of articles 3, 8, and 14 within the 
Convention to abortion access). 
158. See Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for Judicial Review, 
[2015] NIQB 96, 2015 WL 8131461 (holding that Northern Ireland’s legal framework on 
abortion does not comply with article 8 of the European Convention in instances of fatal fetal 
abnormality, serious malformation of the fetus, and instances of rape and incest). See generally 
Reproductive Rights Fact Sheet: Access to a Lawful Abortion, supra note 157 (describing how 
articles 3, 8, and 14 within the European Convention have been applied to abortion and other 
reproductive rights cases). 
159. ECHR, supra note 153, art. 3. 
160. See R.R. v. Poland, No. 27617/04 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 148-152 (2011) (describing the 
general principles of inhuman and degrading treatment protected under Article 3 in the 
European Convention); see also Alyson Zureick, (En)Gendering Suffering: Denial of Abortion 
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denial of abortion services, in certain circumstances, such as in R.R. v. 
Poland, can constitute inhuman or degrading treatment.161 In NIHRC 
Judicial Review, the High Court stated that Article 3 can be violated 
when women are lawfully entitled to obtain certain abortion services 
but are blocked from accessing a procedure to which they are lawfully 
and medically entitled. 162  Although Northern Irish women are 
currently required to travel to other jurisdictions within the United 
Kingdom for abortion services related to fatal fetal abnormalities, 
severe malformation of the fetus, or resulting from a sexual crime, the 
High Court holds this “additional stress” does not satisfy the 
“minimum threshold of severity” to constitute inhuman or degrading 
treatment.163 
The European Court of Human Rights has also analyzed Articles 
8 and 14 within the context of reproductive health care.164 Article 8 
                                                                                                             
as a Form of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 99, 107-09 
(2015) (noting the distinctions between torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment 
according to different charter-based and treaty monitoring bodies). 
161. See R.R. v. Poland, No. 27617/04 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 153-62 (2011) (noting that the 
denial of access to diagnostic testing for concerns about a pregnant woman’s fetal abnormality 
and subsequent denial of access to an abortion amounted to a violation of inhuman treatment 
under Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights); see also Zureick, supra note 
160, at 117 (discussing the European Court’s holding in R.R. that delaying access to genetic 
testing that were a prerequisite for an abortion in Poland were determinative, precluded access 
to an abortion altogether causing mental anguish and amounted to an Article 3 violation). 
162. See Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for Judicial Review, 
¶¶ 114-16 [2015] NIQB 96, 2015 WL 8131461 (relying on P & S v. Poland and R.R. v. 
Poland, emphasizing that both cases sought relief for plaintiffs who were unable to access 
abortion services to which they were lawfully entitled); see, e.g., R.R. v. Poland, No. 27617/04 
Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 153-62 (2011) (denying access to fetal abnormality diagnostic testing and 
access to an abortion amounted to a violation of inhuman treatment under Article 3 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights). 
163. See Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for Judicial Review, 
¶¶ 120-21 [2015] NIQB 96, 2015 WL 8131461 (noting that there is insufficient evidence 
before the High Court to hold that the requirement to travel to an additional pregnancy to 
terminate a pregnancy is any more traumatic in these exceptional circumstances); see also 
Amelia Gentleman, “It Was the Scariest Thing I’ve Ever Done”: The Irish Women Forced to 
Travel for Abortions, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2015/oct/31/abortion-ireland-northern-ireland-women-travel-england-amelia-gentleman 
(describing the harrowing circumstances facing Northern Irish and Irish women who are 
required to travel to certain jurisdictions within the United Kingdom to gain access to abortion 
procedures). 
164. Compare Tysiąc v. Poland, No. 5410/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), with Evans v. United 
Kingdom, No. 6339/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007) (contrasting that the Court in Tysiąc, a therapeutic 
abortion case, holds that an article 8 violation has taken place whereas with Evans, an in-vitro 
fertilization case, the Court holds that an article 8 and 14 violation did not occur). See 
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addresses the right to respect for private and family life, and defines 
these protections as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life, his home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and  freedoms of others.165 
It is important to note that Article 8(2) only allows interference 
into the right to private and family life when this interference is 
legally permitted and when circumstances are extreme and 
exceptional, such as in instances of national security.166 Article 14 
prohibits discrimination such that “[t]he enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status.”167 Taken together, Article 14’s prohibition of discrimination 
on the basis of sex should bar restrictions to Article 8’s protection of 
private and family life that limit access to this right on the basis of 
sex.168 
The European Court of Human Rights recognizes in Tysiąc v. 
Poland that States parties have a positive obligation to respect the 
private life of their citizens, noting that: 
                                                                                                             
generally Reproductive Rights Fact Sheet: Access to a Lawful Abortion, supra note 157 
(discussing relevant European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence to abortion access). 
165. See ECHR, supra note 153, art. 8. 
166 . See ECHR, supra note 153, art. 8(2) (stating permissible instances where 
government interference is permitted to infringe on the right to respect privacy and family 
life). See generally Reproductive Rights Fact Sheet: Access to a Lawful Abortion, supra note 
157 (detailing where the European Court has held article 8 violations in the abortion context). 
167. See ECHR, supra note 153, art. 14. 
168 . Compare R. (on the Application of A) v. Secretary of State for Health, 
C1/2014/1687 [2015] EWCA Civ. 771, [30]-[39], 2015 WL 4401470 (rejecting arguments that 
articles 8 and 14 are violated), with Reproductive Rights Fact Sheet: Access to a Lawful 
Abortion, supra note 157 (noting where the European Court has found Article 8 violations). 
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[T]he Court observes that the very nature of the issues involved 
in decisions to terminate a pregnancy is such that the time factor 
is of critical importance. The procedures in place should 
therefore ensure that such decisions are timely so as to limit or 
prevent damage to a woman’s health which might be occasioned 
by a late abortion. Procedures in which decisions concerning the 
availability of lawful abortion are reviewed post factum cannot 
fulfil such a function. In the Court’s view, the absence of such 
preventive procedures in the domestic law can be said to amount 
to the failure of the State to comply with its positive obligations 
under Article 8 of the Convention.169 
Although there is not an unqualified right to abortion under the 
European Convention of Human Rights, Tysiąc protects the right to 
obtain an abortion in a State Party jurisdiction once it is lawfully 
protected in those circumstances. 170  For example, abortion is 
protected when continued pregnancy poses a risk to a woman’s health 
in Poland: “[o]nce the legislature decides to allow abortion, it must 
not structure its legal framework in a way which would limit real 
possibilities to obtain it.”171 Read in conjunction with other European 
Court of Human Rights decisions, such as R.R. v. Poland, these 
decisions lay the groundwork for personal autonomy in health care 
decisions, including but not limited to reproductive health.172 
In A, B and C v. Ireland, the European Court addressed the 
claims of three applicants that needed to travel to England to access 
lawful abortion services, determining that applicants A and B’s claims 
                                                                                                             
169.  Tysiąc v. Poland, No. 5410/03 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 118 (2007). 
170.  Id. ¶ 116 (noting that the State cannot put barriers in place to obtain abortion when 
it is legal in certain circumstances); Joanna N. Erdman, The Procedural Turn: Abortion at the 
European Court of Human Rights, in Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna N. Erdman & Bernard M. 
Dickens, TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 124-25 (1st ed., 2014) 
(discussing the State’s positive obligation to ensure access to a lawful abortion). 
171.  Tysiąc v. Poland, No. 5410/03 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 116 (2007) (asserting the State’s 
positive obligation to provide access to abortion procedures within lawful circumstances); 
Erdman, supra note 170, at 124-25 (describing that the State has a positive obligation to ensure 
the pregnant woman has access to the requisite procedure for a lawful abortion). 
172. See R.R. v. Poland, No. 27617/04 Eur Ct. H.R. (2011) (holding that denying access 
to abortion amounted to ill-treatment); see also Laurens Lavrysen, R.R. v. Poland: Health 
Rights under Art. 8 ECHR, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (June 2, 2011), http://strasbourgobserv
ers.com/2011/06/02/r-r-v-poland-health-rights-under-art-8-echr/ (emphasizing the importance 
of R.R. in establishing personal autonomy and the rights of the patient in health care). 
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did not constitute an Article 8 violation.173 Because applicant C was 
suffering from a rare form of cancer and feared for her life once she 
became pregnant, the European Court held that requiring her to travel 
to England to obtain a lawful abortion did constitute an Article 8 
violation.174 The European Court relies on the deferential standard of 
the Margin of Appreciation, holding that the State has the authority to 
determine its level of rights protections for potential life. 175  The 
European Court of Human Rights did note the Republic of Ireland’s 
extremely strict prohibition on abortion, noting that complainant A 
would have been able to access abortion in forty other European 
states on health and well-being grounds and complainant B would 
have been able to access abortion services in thirty-five States on 
well-being grounds.176 Despite holding that there was no Article 8 
violation, this comparative legal analysis pegs the Republic of Ireland 
as a European outlier on the circumstances in which abortion is 
permitted. 177  A, B and C also addresses the Article 14 violation 
implicated by Irish women needing to travel to the United Kingdom 
to access abortion services, but declines to decide on these grounds.178 
                                                                                                             
173. A, B and C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 241-42 (2010) (asserting that 
it was within Ireland’s Margin of Appreciation to determine its level of rights protections to 
afford to protect potential life); Erdman, supra note 170, at 125 (noting that A and B’s 
challenge was to legalize abortion when the woman’s health was at risk). 
174. A, B and C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 243-68 (2010) (analyzing 
Ireland’s obligations to protect against arbitrary interference into people’s private lives under 
Article 8 of the European Convention); Stijn Smet, A., B. and C. v. Ireland: Abortion and the 
Margin of Appreciation, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (Dec. 17, 2010), http://strasbourgobserver
s.com/2010/12/17/a-b-and-c-v-ireland-abortion-and-the-margin-of-appreciation/ (noting the 
requirement for Ireland to pass legislation to be in compliance with the decision). 
175. A, B and C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 241-42 (2010) (asserting that 
it was within Ireland’s Margin of Appreciation to determine its level of rights protections to 
afford to protect potential life); Smet, supra note 174 (describing the disconnect between 
applying the Margin of Appreciation principle while noting Ireland as a regional outlier from 
the European consensus). 
176. A, B and C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 241-42 (2010) (applying 
regional comparative law to illustrate how restrictive the abortion law is in the Republic of 
Ireland); World Abortion Map, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. http://worldabortionlaws.com/map/ 
(illustrating Ireland and Northern Ireland as regional outliers with far more restrictive abortion 
laws). 
177. A, B and C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 241-42 (2010) (upholding the 
Republic of Ireland’s legal framework while noting its restrictiveness as compared to other 
countries in the region); World Abortion Map, supra note 176, Europe (demonstrating how the 
rest of the region permits abortion in more circumstances). 
178. A, B and C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 269-70 (2010) (stating that 
the Court will not decide on these grounds). See generally Reproductive Rights Fact Sheet: 
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Articles 8 and 14 were also raised in the NIHRC Judicial 
Review.179 The NIHRC Judicial Review held that prohibiting abortion 
in instances of fatal fetal abnormality and pregnancies resulting from 
sexual crimes violate Article 8, the right to respect for private and 
family life. 180  When one’s personal autonomy is infringed under 
Article 8(1), the Government must justify this intrusion “in 
accordance with the law, for a legitimate aim, necessary in a 
democratic society,” which is not justifiable in instances of fatal fetal 
abnormality, rape, or incest.181 The High Court also emphasized that 
requiring women to travel to other United Kingdom jurisdictions, 
such as England or Wales, creates an emotional burden on those 
obligated to travel and a disproportionate impact on low-income 
individuals.182  Despite this assertion of the burden on low-income 
women, the High Court held that there was not “a clear inequality of 
treatment in the enjoyment of a substantive right [that] is a 
fundamental aspect of the case” and therefore there was no Article 14 
                                                                                                             
Access to a Lawful Abortion, supra note 157 (illustrating that the Court has declined to decide 
abortion cases on Article 14 grounds). 
179. See ECHR, supra note 153, arts. 8, 14 (establishing the right to respect for privacy 
and family life and non-discrimination); see Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s 
Application for Judicial Review, ¶¶ 122-72 [2015] NIQB 96, 2015 WL 8131461 (noting that 
there is an Article 8 violation, but no Article 14 violation); see also R. (on the Application of 
A) v. Secretary of State for Health, C1/2014/1687 [2015] EWCA Civ. 771, [30]-[39], 2015 
WL 4401470  (rejecting arguments that articles 8 and 14 are violated).  
180. Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for Judicial Review, ¶¶ 
145-46, 148, 160-62, 166 [2015] NIQB 96, 2015 WL 8131461 (holding that fatal fetal 
abnormalities and pregnancies resulting from sexual crimes constitute Article 8 violations); see 
ECHR, supra note 153, art. 8 (protecting the right to respect for private and family life from 
governmental interference). 
181. Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for Judicial Review, ¶¶ 
145-46, 148, 160-62, 166 [2015] NIQB 96, 2015 WL 8131461 (analyzing fatal fetal 
abnormalities, severe malformations of the fetus, and pregnancy resulting from a sexual crime 
under the Article 8 balancing test, holding that criminalizing abortion in instances of severe 
malformations of the fetus does not amount to an Article 8 violation); see Amelia Gentleman, 
A Milestone for Abortion in Northern Ireland-But Where Does the Law Stand?, THE 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/nov/30/northern-
ireland-abortion-laws-human-rights (describing that the current legal framework only violates 
human rights in instances of fatal fetal abnormality, rape, and incest). 
182. Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for Judicial Review, ¶ 
154 [2015] NIQB 96, 2015 WL 8131461 (stating the heavier burden that lower income women 
experience by being required to travel to other jurisdictions to obtain abortion services); see 
also Northern Ireland: Barriers to Accessing Abortion Services, supra note 18, at 17-20 
(describing the stigma that Northern Irish women face, which is exacerbated by the 
requirement to travel outside of the jurisdiction to obtain the procedure). 
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violation on the prohibition on discrimination.183 The High Court also 
notes that the R case holds that the differential treatment that pregnant 
women in Northern Ireland face as compared to women in England 
and Scotland does not constitute direct or indirect discrimination.184 
Finally, the High Court emphasizes that the prohibition on 
discrimination only applies with respect to other European 
Convention rights, and since the High Court already found an Article 
8 violation, determining the existence of an Article 14 violation is 
unnecessary.185 
C. Impact of Criminalizing Abortion in Northern Ireland 
Despite the holding in NIHRC Judicial Review, abortion is still a 
criminal offense in Northern Ireland, except in instances where 
continuing the pregnancy poses a permanent or long-term threat to the 
woman’s physical or mental health; this legal framework stigmatizes 
abortion.186 Criminal sanctions assign “deviance” to women seeking 
                                                                                                             
183. Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for Judicial Review, ¶ 
167-72 [2015] NIQB 96, 2015 WL 8131461 (describing the test for an Article 14 breach). See 
generally Rory O’Connell, Cinderella Comes to the Ball: Article 14 and the Right to Non-
Discrimination in the ECHR, 29 J. OF THE SOC’Y OF LEGAL SCHOLARS 211, 211-29 (2009) 
(describing the traditional emphasis on formal equality within European Court of Human 
Rights jurisprudence).  
184. Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for Judicial Review, ¶ 
171 [2015] NIQB 96, 2015 WL 8131461 (explaining that the R court did not find the varying 
access to abortion services on the basis of their jurisdiction to constitute discrimination within 
the meaning of Article 14); see also R. (on the Application of A) v. Secretary of State for 
Health, C1/2014/1687 [2015] EWCA Civ. 771, [47]-[50], 2015 WL 4401470 (stating that 
pregnant women from Northern Ireland compared to other women from the United Kingdom 
do not experience discrimination on prescribed grounds in their inability to access NHS 
coverage for abortion services). 
185. Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for Judicial Review, ¶ 
168 [2015] NIQB 96, 2015 WL 8131461 (relying upon Dudgeon v. United Kingdom and A, B 
and C v. Ireland as precedent that the prohibition on discrimination only applies to the breach 
of European Convention rights and does not need to be reviewed once there is a breach of 
another article. However, the Court may inquire into Article 14 violations in these instances); 
A, B and C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 270 (2010) (stating that the European 
Court will not inquire into Article 14 violations since it already found an Article 8 violation). 
186. See Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for Judicial Review, 
¶¶ 3-5 [2015] NIQB 102, 2015 WL 9112625 (determining the current legal framework cannot 
be interpreted as Convention-compliant, but is provisional for other courts or legislature to 
decide); see also supra Part II.A (describing the legal framework in Northern Ireland); 
Rebecca J. Cook, Stigmatized Meanings of Criminal Abortion Law in ABORTION LAW, in 
Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna N. Erdman & Bernard M. Dickens, TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: 
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abortions and medical professionals who provide these services, 
reinforcing the idea that abortion is an immoral act that society deems 
reprehensible.187 As a result, many women fear the consequences of 
their family or friends discovering that they have had an abortion.188 
Stigma perpetuates and seemingly legitimizes that women should 
experience guilt or shame when obtaining an abortion, which is 
worsened by women’s need to travel outside of Northern Ireland to 
obtain the procedure.189 
Anand Grover, the former Special Rapporteur on the Right of 
Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Physical and Mental Health (“Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Health”) addressed the variety of problematic outcomes of abortion 
criminalization in its 2011 Report. 190  Focusing on the impact of 
criminal laws on reproductive health and the right to health, Grover 
stated “[c]riminal laws penalizing and restricting induced abortion are 
the paradigmatic examples of impermissible barriers to the realization 
                                                                                                             
CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 347 (1st ed., 2014) (noting that criminalizing abortion ascribes a 
social meaning of “inherently wrong and harmful to society”). 
187 . See Cook, supra note 186, at 347-49 (describing the history and impact of 
criminalization on women); see also Human Rights Council, Interim Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Physical and Mental Health, U.N. Doc. A/66/254, ¶ 21 (Aug. 3 2011) [hereinafter Interim 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health] (noting the criminalization of 
abortion as a barrier to the realization of women’s right to health). 
188. See Northern Ireland: Barriers to Accessing Abortion Services, supra note 18, at 
15-16, 20 (noting women’s desire to keep the procedure secret due to the stigma); see also 
Real Stories of Abortion in Northern Ireland: Irene’s Story, FAMILY PLANNING ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.fpa.org.uk/abortion-in-northern-ireland/video-stories (last visited Jan. 11, 2016) 
(describing the need to pretend to go to London on holiday to obtain an abortion). 
189. See Northern Ireland: Barriers to Accessing Abortion Services, supra note 18, at 
19-20 (describing the frustration that women face by needing to travel outside of Northern 
Ireland to access abortion services); see also Real Stories of Abortion in Northern Ireland, 
FAMILY PLANNING ASSOCIATION, http://www.fpa.org.uk/abortion-in-northern-ireland/video-
stories (last visited Jan. 11, 2016) (noting the challenges with needing to travel to England to 
obtain abortion access). 
190. See Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, supra note 
187, ¶ 35 (stating that women will seek clandestine, often unsafe abortion procedures to 
terminate unwanted pregnancies); see also Northern Ireland: Barriers to Accessing Abortion 
Services, supra note 18, at 11 (describing the coat hanger advocacy campaign which illustrated 
the two alternatives that women faced, clandestine abortions or travel to other UK 
jurisdictions). 
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of women’s right to health and must be eliminated.”191 Furthermore, 
Grover highlights the cyclical nature of the resulting stigma: 
“[c]riminalization of abortion results in women seeking clandestine, 
and likely unsafe, abortions. The stigma resulting from procuring an 
illegal abortion and thereby breaking the law perpetuates the notion 
that abortion is an immoral practice and that the procedure is 
inherently unsafe, which then reinforces continuing criminalization of 
the practice.”192 
Beyond confronting the crippling stigma, the fact that one to two 
thousand women annually must leave the Northern Irish borders to 
obtain a safe abortion also requires them to have the means to afford 
the travel costs and the procedure cost at the private clinic.193 In many 
cases, the impracticability of traveling to the United Kingdom to 
obtain an abortion may leave women with the “choice” of carrying an 
unwanted pregnancy to term or pursuing clandestine, unsafe 
alternatives.194 Since unsafe abortions have severe health outcomes 
                                                                                                             
191. See Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, supra note 
187, ¶ 21. Former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Anand Grover, supports this 
assertion with this justification:  
These laws infringe women’s dignity and autonomy by severely restricting decision-
making by women in respect of their sexual and reproductive health. Moreover, 
such laws consistently generate poor physical health outcomes resulting in deaths 
that could have been prevented, morbidity and ill-health, as well as negative mental 
health outcomes, not least because affected women risk being thrust into the 
criminal justice system.  
See generally Cook, supra note 186, at 347-69 (illustrating the role the mutually reinforcing 
role that criminalization and stigma play, pushing women’s abortion experiences underground 
and posing serious risks to their health). 
192.  See Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, supra note 
187, ¶ 35. 
193. See Northern Ireland: Barriers to Accessing Abortion Services, supra note 18, at 
11, 16-18 (describing the choice to travel or seek out clandestine alternatives). See generally 
Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, supra note 187, ¶¶ 21-35 
(discussing how criminalization and restrictive regulations limit women’s access to their right 
to health). 
194. See Northern Ireland: Barriers to Accessing Abortion Services, supra note 18, at 
11, 16-18 (noting the choice to travel or resort to unsafe alternatives, explaining the statistics 
of women that travel to access abortion services annually and the financial requirements to 
access abortion services); see also R. (on the Application of A) v. Secretary of State for 
Health, C1/2014/1687 [2015] EWCA Civ. 771, [2], 2015 WL 4401470 (illustrating the 
unreliability of statistics about Northern Irish women seeking abortions in England, since 
Alliance for Choice estimates suggest that the actual number is double the official figure). See 
generally Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, supra note 187, ¶¶ 
21-35 (detailing the impact that criminalization and restrictive regulations have on curtailing 
women’s right to health). 
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for women, resulting in serious infections, infertility, or death, 
criminalization and stigma can have far-reaching consequences for 
women who cannot carry an unwanted child to term.195 
III. PROTECTING ABORTION ACCESS FROM BEING A POSTAL 
CODE LOTTERY THROUGH PRIVACY AND EQUALITY LENSES 
Texas and Northern Ireland provide illustrative examples in 
different contexts of how the jurisdiction where a woman lives in the 
United States or the United Kingdom is dispositive in determining the 
available health coverage, which is in direct violation of the rights 
protecting access to abortion.196 Section A of this Part will argue that 
in United States jurisprudence, the Equal Protection Clause must be 
invoked alongside the Due Process Clause to protect the fundamental 
right to abortion, using intersectionality to determine suspect 
classifications. This Section will also emphasize the importance of 
being able to physically access an abortion as the key consideration of 
whether a fundamental right is being respected. Section B will also 
contend that the jurisdictional rationale used to offset the United 
Kingdom and Northern Ireland’s obligations under the European 
Court of Human Rights is insufficient and results in an unequal 
application of fundamental rights to Northern Irish women. 
A. Impact of Exceptions on a Woman’s Right to Access Reproductive 
Care Within the United States 
This section will (1) focus on the role that applying the Equal 
Protection Clause alongside the Due Process Clause can play in 
identifying regulations that violate the undue burden standard; (2) 
propose the application of an intersectional lens when determining 
                                                                                                             
195. See Sneha Barot, Unsafe Abortion: The Missing Link in Global Efforts to Improve 
Maternal Health, 14(2) GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. (June 2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/
pubs/gpr/14/2/gpr140224.html (noting the unsafe health outcomes that women face from 
unsafe abortions); 2012 SAFE ABORTION GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 19-20 (describing the 
health risks that women face from obtaining unsafe abortions). 
196 . See State Policies in Brief: Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, 
GUTTMACHER INST. (2015), https://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_TRAP.pdf 
[hereinafter State Policies in Brief: TRAP Laws] (analyzing the TRAP laws in effect in each 
US state); see also Abortion Act 1967 § 1(1), 7(3) (comparing the legality of abortion in 
England, Wales, and Scotland, as compared to Northern Ireland). 
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protected classes in the Equal Protection analysis; and (3) review the 
actual impact that the TRAP laws are having on Texan women. 
1. A Strong Relationship Between the Liberty Right and Equal 
Protection 
As Justice Kennedy discussed in Obergefell, “the Equal 
Protection Clause can help to identify and correct inequalities . . . 
vindicating precepts of liberty and equality under the Constitution.”197 
Applying this principle to the right to abortion, as it currently stands, 
where a woman lives in the United States dictates her ability to access 
this fundamental right. 198  Despite the fact that the undue burden 
standard under Casey only permits the state to enact regulations that 
may encourage a woman to choose childbirth over an abortion, “[a]n 
undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its 
purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”199 
Since Casey was decided, courts have inquired to various extents 
about whether the purpose or effect of certain legislation poses 
substantial obstacles to a woman’s right to an abortion. 200  An 
efficacious review of challenged legislation’s effect on women’s 
health—in comparison to the ways in which it limits a woman’s right 
to an abortion—can provide insight into the purpose or effect of such 
legislation. 201  Reviewing the putative medical benefits of abortion 
                                                                                                             
197. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.       , 21 (2015). 
198. See State Policies in Brief: TRAP Laws, supra note 196 (comparing the TRAP laws 
across States); see, e.g., Deprez, supra note 59 (noting the anti-abortion legislation limits the 
provision of abortion services in certain states). 
199. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-78 (1992) (establishing 
the threshold that a regulation must pass to be struck down as an undue burden); see also 
Khiara M. Bridges, supra note 36, at 1311-19 (describing the structure and function of the 
undue burden standard). 
200. Compare Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157-58, 161-62 (2007) (upholding the 
intact D&E ban since an alternate, less safe procedure, the D&E, was available), with Planned 
Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, No. 15-1736, 8-15, 24-26 (7th Cir. 2015) (emphasizing 
that abortion complications are rare, admitting privileges requirements do not provide 
significant additional benefit to the transfer agreements between abortion clinics and nearby 
hospitals in the event of complications, and the legislative purpose is to restrict abortion 
access). 
201.  Schimel, No. 15-1736 at 22-23. 
To determine whether the burden imposed by the statute is ‘undue’ (excessive), the 
court must ‘weigh the burdens against the state’s justification, asking whether and to 
what extent the challenged regulation actually advances the state’s interests. If a 
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regulations is critical, not only to determine whether there is a 
potential medical benefit from this regulation, but also to assess 
whether this will preclude many women from accessing their right to 
obtain an abortion.202 For example, in Schimel, Judge Posner focuses 
on the State of Wisconsin’s argument that women can travel to 
Chicago to obtain access to abortion services once TRAP laws in 
Wisconsin have forced clinics in Milwaukee to close:  
[A] 90-mile trip is no big deal for persons who own a car or can 
afford an Amtrak or Greyhound ticket. But more than 50 percent 
of Wisconsin women seeking abortions have incomes below the 
federal poverty line and many of them live in Milwaukee. . . . For 
them a round trip to Chicago, and finding a place to stay 
overnight in Chicago . . . may be prohibitively expensive. . . . 
These women may also be unable to take the time required for 
the round trip away from their work or the care of their children. . 
. . 18 to 24 percent of women who would need to travel to 
Chicago or the surrounding area for an abortion would be unable 
to make the trip.203  
Given the “nonexistent” medical benefit that admitting 
privileges requirements confer to Wisconsin women and that nearly 
one-quarter of women who would be required to travel to Chicago for 
abortion services cannot make the trip due to their income level or 
lack of social support resources, the purpose and effect of admitting 
                                                                                                             
burden significantly exceeds what is necessary to advance the state’s interests, it is 
‘undue,’ which is to say unconstitutional. The feebler the medical grounds (in this 
case, they are nonexistent), the likelier is the burden on the right to abortion to be 
disproportionate to the benefits and therefore excessive. 
Id. (citing Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(emphasis added)). See generally Evaluating Priorities: Measuring Women’s and Children’s 
Health and Well-Being Against Abortion Restrictions in the States, IBIS REPROD. HEALTH & 
CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS (2014), http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/
files/documents/Priorities_Project.pdf (noting the inverse relationship between the number of 
TRAP laws and a State’s performance on its maternal health, child health, and social 
determinants of health indicators). 
202. Schimel, No. 15-1736 at 22-23 (citing Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2014)) 
(establishing the balancing test between the potential medical benefit of an abortion regulation 
with the burden that the restriction imposes on women); see also Boonstra & Nash, supra note 
59, at 12-13 (noting the disproportionate impact of TRAP laws on low-income women, young 
women, immigrant women, and women of color by requiring these women to travel greater 
distances and increasing the risk of abortion complications). 
203. Schimel, No. 15-1736 at 22. 
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privileges is to pose a substantial obstacle to women’s right to 
abortion.204  
Accordingly, in challenges to TRAP laws, the relationship 
between the liberty right within the Due Process Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clause should be emphasized to protect fundamental 
rights, as was held in Obergefell.205 The Equal Protection Clause will 
be particularly helpful in determining whether the regulation imposes 
an undue burden to accessing abortion in a discriminatory manner.206 
In most instances, the legislature does not explicitly state that the 
purpose of a particular regulation is to limit women’s access to 
abortion, but instead purports that it is a regulation to protect 
women’s health. 207  As is the case with admitting privileges or 
ambulatory surgical center requirements, however, it results in 
numerous clinic closures across the state, meaning that women that 
live in proximity to urban centers have a higher likelihood of 
accessing an abortion as compared to women that live in rural areas, 
far away from metropolises. 208  States have attempted to use the 
argument that it is permissible to travel across state lines to a closer 
                                                                                                             
204. See id. at 22-25 (“Opponents of abortion reveal their true objectives when they 
procure legislation limited to a medical procedure—abortion—that rarely produces a medical 
emergency.”); see also Culp-Ressler, supra note 78 (describing that TRAP Laws do not 
improve women’s quality of care and illuminate the purpose of lawmakers to restrict access to 
abortion without banning it outright). 
205. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.       , 21 (2015) (noting the relationship between the 
liberty right under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause); see also Farrell, 
supra note 32, at 247-48 (describing how the Court often views its fundamental rights tests 
under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses as interchangeable when it sees fit). 
206. See Kay, supra note 101, at 374 (noting the disproportionate impact on barriers to 
abortion services on women of color). See generally Ginsburg, supra note 93 (describing the 
importance of viewing access to abortion through a sex equality perspective). 
207. See Kay, supra note 101, at 381 (arguing that equal protection should shift its focus 
away from the intent to who experiences discrimination as a result of a particular regulation); 
see also Davis, 426 U.S. at 238-52 (illustrating the limitations of using a purpose requirement 
to address discriminatory effects). See generally Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 64 
(describing the clinic closures that result when legislatures pass TRAP laws under the auspices 
of “protecting women’s health”). 
208. See Bassett, supra note 13 (illustrating the concentration of abortion providers in 
urban centers); see also Rebecca Wind, One-Third of U.S. Women Seeking Abortions Travel 
More than 25 Miles to Access Services, GUTTMACHER INST. (July. 26, 2013), http://www.
guttmacher.org/media/nr/2013/07/26/ (“It is therefore not surprising that 31% of women who 
lived in rural areas traveled more than 100 miles to access abortion services, and an additional 
43% traveled between 50–100 miles. Rural women are underrepresented among abortion 
patients.”). 
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city in a neighboring state to fulfill its constitutional obligations.209 
However, recalling Gaines and Ezell, a state cannot discharge its 
constitutional obligations by foisting the responsibility of fulfilling 
fundamental rights onto another state. 210  Viewing these travel 
requirements through the Equal Protection Clause illustrates the 
discriminatory barriers that a woman in one state must face to access 
abortion that a woman in a different state would not, while 
simultaneously highlighting the undue burden that women must 
experience to access their constitutional right to abortion.211 
Low-income women, women of color, young women, and 
immigrant women are disproportionately burdened by these 
regulations, due to concerns about taking time off from work, costs 
and barriers to travel, or hurdles to obtaining judicial bypass in a 
parental consent state.212 Wealthier woman will be able to afford child 
care, take paid vacation time, or afford the travel cost to the provider 
of their choosing.213 The Equal Protection lens here also illustrates 
that TRAP laws pose substantial obstacles to a woman’s right to 
choose an abortion since it becomes impracticable for many women 
                                                                                                             
209. Compare Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. Currier, No. 13-60599 (5th Cir. 
2015) (stating that Mississippi could not require women seeking abortions to travel to another 
state to access their constitutional rights), with Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, No. 14-50928 
at *55 (5th Cir. 2015) (claiming that Texas can fulfill its constitutional obligations since El 
Paso shares a metropolitan area with Santa Teresa, New Mexico). 
210. See State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (stating that 
Missouri cannot satisfy its constitutional obligations by relying on services available in other 
states); see also Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 697 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that 
abridging the exercise of certain constitutional rights cannot be justified based on the 
assumption that those rights can be exercised in another jurisdiction). 
211. See State Policies in Brief: TRAP Laws, supra note 196 (illustrating the difference 
between the TRAP laws in effect between States); see also Farrell, supra note 32, at 246-48 
(noting where the Court has applied the Equal Protection Clause in the Due Process analysis 
previously). 
212. See Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, No. 15-1736, 22 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(describing the strain that low-income women would face if required to travel to Chicago to 
obtain a late-term abortion); Bassett, supra note 13 (demonstrating the disproportionate impact 
on low-income Texan women, in particular. See generally Nuestro Texas Report, supra note 
12 (noting the impact of the reproductive health restrictions on women living in the Rio 
Grande valley). 
213. See Schimel, No. 15-1736 at 22 (stating that women who can afford to travel to 
Chicago are not burdened by the requirement to travel); Bassett, supra note 13 (noting that 
wealthy women have always been able to access abortions); see also Heidi Williamson, Roe 
Should Be a Reality for All, Not Just a Wealthy Few, TALK POVERTY (Jan. 22, 2015), http://
talkpoverty.org/2015/01/22/roe-reality-just-wealthy/ (describing the barriers that low income 
women face to access abortions). 
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to overcome these hurdles.214 As a critical precursor to the right to 
choose an abortion, women must first have access to the procedure in 
practical effect.215 If women cannot afford an abortion or schedule an 
appointment with a provider who meets the state’s requirements, then 
these women are not presented with the fundamental right to choose 
an abortion. 216  “Choice” becomes a cruel word to describe the 
woman’s obligation to turn to clandestine alternatives or to carry an 
unwanted pregnancy to term.217 As such, in Whole Woman’s Health, 
the Court must look at the practical effect of the TRAP regulations on 
women’s health, finding that (1) these regulations do not help to 
advance women’s health and safety and (2) these regulations pose a 
substantial obstacle to the right to an abortion, thus constituting an 
undue burden.218 
The equality doctrine has been conspicuously absent within 
abortion jurisprudence in the United States, since the rights to privacy 
and liberty have done most of the heavy lifting. 219  Through the 
application of the Obergefell framework to introduce Equal Protection 
into the discussion, McRae’s holding that denies low-income women 
                                                                                                             
214 . See George, supra note 27, at 301-02 (describing the inadequacy of the 
reproductive “choice” framework to address low-income women’s reproductive autonomy and 
the necessity to focus on issues of racial inequality to achieve reproductive justice); see also 
Kay, supra note 101, at 385 (noting the importance of focusing on the laws that have a 
negative impact on women’s access to abortion). 
215. See Bassett, supra note 13 (illustrating the practical difficulties that Texan women 
face to obtain abortion services); see also State Policies in Brief: TRAP Laws, supra note 196 
(showing the regulations that can preclude women’s access to abortions in different states). 
216.  See generally Amber, supra note 2 (describing the impact of overbooking and the 
requirement to see the same provider throughout the abortion process); State Policies in Brief: 
TRAP Laws, supra note 196 (illustrating the state’s burdensome requirements to access an 
abortion by state). 
217. See George, supra note 27, at 301-02 (describing the failures of the term “choice” 
to meet many women’s needs); see also Fact Sheet: The Hyde Amendment Creates an 
Unacceptable Barrier to Women Getting Abortions, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. (July 2015) 
(noting the impact that the Hyde Amendment has on low income women’s ability to access an 
abortion procedure). 
218. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 72, at 32-36 (noting that the Court must 
actually review the impact that a regulation has on women’s health when determining if a 
regulation poses an undue burden). See generally Benson Gold & Nash, supra note 61 
(describing that TRAP laws do not protect women’s health and safety). 
219. See supra Part I. See generally Ginsburg, supra note 93, at 375-86 (describing the 
weakness of abortion jurisprudence without a sex equality lens); Law, supra note 110, at 955-
1040 (advocating for a sex equality approach to women’s access to abortion). 
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access to abortion through Medicaid could be re-visited.220 Since the 
primary way in which low-income women access health care is 
through Medicaid coverage, allowing Medicaid funding to cover 
abortion services would address the current insurmountable barriers 
and substantial obstacles.221 An Equal Protection lens may also open 
the door to the re-evaluation of pregnancy discrimination as sex 
discrimination, reconsidering Geduldig, since only women who 
cannot obtain abortions would be deprived of their liberty rights.222 
2. Focus on Intersectional Discrimination to Determine Suspect 
Classification 
When applying the Equal Protection lens to identify Due Process 
Clause violations, using an intersectional approach to analyze 
disproportionate impact on a protected class will be critically 
important for reviewing whether regulations pose an undue burden on 
women’s ability to access abortions.223 The intersectional approach 
focuses on the interconnectedness of an individual’s classifications on 
the basis of gender, race, age, and class, acknowledging that these 
identities are not mutually exclusive and can have compounding 
discriminatory effects. 224  Reductions in scrutiny either related to 
                                                                                                             
220. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.       , 21 (2015) (noting the application of the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses to address a potential infringement on a fundamental 
right); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980) (holding that the United States is not 
obligated to provide federal funding for abortion services through Medicaid). 
221. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (stating that low-income women who 
access their health care needs through Medicaid are denied access to abortions as a result of 
the Hyde Amendment); see also George, supra note 27, at 301-04 (noting the importance of 
confronting structural poverty issues within the reproductive justice framework when 
addressing low income women’s access to abortion). 
222. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974) (holding that pregnancy-
discrimination did not constitute sex discrimination); see also Siegel & Siegel, supra note 91, 
at 771-98 (noting the importance of taking a sex equality approach to address discrimination 
that women face, including pregnancy discrimination). 
223. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist 
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 142-43 (1989) (establishing the discourse on 
intersectional discrimination that women of color face, in particular). See generally George, 
supra note 27 (addressing how reproductive oppression has disproportionately impacted 
communities of color, immigrant women, and low income women, and discussing how a 
human rights approach is critical to address structural inequality concerns). 
224. See Crenshaw, supra note 223, at 150-52 (noting the mutually reinforcing nature of 
different identities); see also Aisha Nicole Davis, Intersectionality and International Law: 
Recognizing Complex Identities on the Global Stage, 28 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 205, 207-12 
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Equal Protection claims on the basis of gender or undue burden 
claims under the Due Process Clause make it increasingly possible for 
problematic restrictions to remain in place. 225  The Court has 
previously made these determinations on the basis of a sole 
classification, such as race, gender, or socioeconomic status. 226 
However, since people are not only classified by a single trait, people 
experience discrimination as, for example, a person of color, a 
woman, and low-income individual simultaneously.227 Accordingly, 
since looking at structural discrimination through any one of these 
lenses alone is insufficient to assess the discrimination that the 
individual faces, a multidimensional analysis based on intersectional 
discrimination should be used to determine whether a fundamental 
right is being infringed.228  
To critically evaluate the importance of applying the 
intersectionality framework, reviewing the Court’s holding in McRae 
serves as an illustration of the failings of a single-trait identification 
of a suspect class and the importance of applying a multi-factor test to 
                                                                                                             
(2015) (noting the shortcomings of single-issue classification, where race and sex 
discrimination cannot be considered simultaneously). 
225. See Bridges, supra note 36, at 1293 n.23 (noting that the undue burden standard is a 
weaker standard of review than Roe’s trimester framework); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-87 (1992) (upholding all of the abortion restrictions, including 
waiting periods, parental consent, and “informed consent”). 
226. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (establishing 
a limited presumption of constitutionality when particular regulations affect a “discrete and 
insular minority”); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980) (focusing on solely on 
income level as the rationale for the decision); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Symposium Article: 
Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an 
Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 301-07 (2001) (noting that 
courts have declined to decide on intersectional grounds, and have looked an discrimination as 
an “either/or” issue, where discrimination is because of one category or another rather than 
both categories). 
227 . See generally Crenshaw, supra note 223, at 142-43 (addressing the multiple 
vehicles through which individuals can experience discrimination); Nancy Ehrenreich, Article: 
Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support Between Subordinating 
Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251 (2002) (describing how structural oppression is proliferated 
by addressing discrimination along the lines of identity groups). 
228. See Hutchinson, supra note 226, at 301-07 (describing how turning a blind eye to 
intersectional discrimination disregards the unique position of a person experiencing multiple 
forms of discrimination simultaneously); see also Crenshaw, supra note 223, at 140 
(highlighting that “the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism”). 
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determine whether a class should be protected.229 McRae challenged 
the Hyde Amendment—only permitting Medicaid funding for 
abortion in limited circumstances—the Court held that the 
Government did not have a positive obligation to provide funding to 
women to access abortion. 230  This holding has had a significant 
impact on the accessibility of the procedure, particularly for lower 
income, non-white women.231 
[A]lthough government may not place obstacles in the path of a 
woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove 
those not of its own creation. . . . The financial constraints that 
restrict an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy the full range of 
constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not 
of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of 
her indigency.232 
Here, the Court hides behind the fact that guarantees of fundamental 
rights in the United States are negative rights obligations rather than 
positive ones, without acknowledging that denying Medicaid funding 
for abortion services per se precludes low-income women from 
accessing their fundamental rights.233 
This is corollary to the discussion in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent 
in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., where the exclusion of certain 
contraceptives illustrates the disproportionate impact that denying 
                                                                                                             
229.  Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980) (deciding that low-income women who 
receive their health care through Medicaid should not be required to obtain access to abortion 
services through Medicaid funding). See generally Crenshaw, supra note 223. 
230 . McRae, 448 U.S. at 317. The conditions under the Hyde Amendment were 
broadened in 1993 to allow Medicaid funding to cover abortions in exceptional circumstances 
of rape and incest in addition to life endangerment. See Fried, supra note 1, at 212-13. 
231. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 317-18 (detailing that the government is not required to 
ensure that women’s fundamental right to abortion is realized through Medicaid funding); see 
also Distribution of the Nonelderly with Medicaid by Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAMILY 
FOUNDATION (2013), http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/distribution-by-raceethnicity-4/ 
(indicating that fifty-nine percent of Medicaid recipients are non-white). 
232. McRae, 448 U.S. at 317. 
233. Positive rights obligations are ways in which the government must act to guarantee 
certain rights whereas negative rights solely protect certain areas from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2272 (1990); see supra note 45-46 and accompanying text (disregarding 
the reality that low-income women receive health care through Medicaid and are denied 
abortion access when Medicaid cannot cover the procedure); Kay, supra note 101, at 374 
n.100 (describing that the impact of the Hyde Amendment “was tantamount to a total denial of 
access to abortion for low-income women”). 
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insurance coverage for contraceptives would have on low-income 
women.234  For example, intrauterine devices are more effective at 
preventing pregnancy than more affordable forms like condoms or 
birth control pills.235 Yet, once cost barriers to these more effective 
kinds of contraceptives are removed, women overwhelmingly select 
the more effective forms of birth control over their counterparts.236 
When contraceptives are not provided through insurance, this 
disadvantages women from receiving necessary health care since 
contraceptives can be prohibitively expensive.237 Without insurance 
coverage, a minimum wage earner would need to pay roughly one full 
month’s salary to access an intrauterine device.238 These same cost-
considerations are particularly applicable to women in an abortion 
context, where the average first trimester abortion costs US$470, 
which increases along with the gestational period, and can cost up to 
US$3,000. 239  Using the same formula as the Guttmacher Institute 
                                                                                                             
234. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2788-89, 2800 (2014) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the disproportionate impact that denying contraceptive 
coverage would have on low-income women); see also State of Birth Control Coverage: 
Health Plan Violations of the Affordable Care Act, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., 1 n.1, http://
www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/stateofcoverage2015final.pdf (noting that moderate out-
of-pocket costs can preclude low- and middle-income women from accessing essential 
preventative care that they need). 
235. See Birth Control Guide, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFFICE OF WOMEN’S HEALTH, 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForWomen/FreePublications/UC
M356451.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2016) (describing efficacy of different birth control 
options); see also Gregor Aisch & Bill Marsh, How Likely Is It that Birth Control Can Let You 
Down?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/14/sunday-
review/unplanned-pregnancies.html?_r=0 (illustrating the pregnancy failure rate for various 
kinds of birth controls). 
236 . Gina M. Secura et al., Provision of No-Cost, Long-Acting Contraception and 
Teenage Pregnancy, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1316, table 1 (2014), http://www.nejm.org/doi/
full/10.1056/NEJMoa1400506#t=articleResults (stating that of the 1404 young women that 
participated in this study, 1132 selected long-acting, reversible contraceptive methods, 
including intrauterine devices, compared to 175 using hormonal birth control pills); see 
Heather D. Boonstra, Leveling the Playing Field: The Promise of Long-Acting Reversible 
Contraceptives for Adolescents, 16 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 15 (2013) (noting the barrier 
that cost poses to adolescents selecting long-acting reversible contraceptives as a contraceptive 
method). 
237.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2788-89 (2014) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting); see also supra note 234 and accompanying text (asserting the impact that out-
of-pocket costs can have on access to contraceptives). 
238. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2800 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
239. See Are You in the Know?: Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. http://www.guttmacher.
org/in-the-know/abortion-costs.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2015) (stating the average cost of a 
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applied in their Amicus Curiae brief for consideration in Hobby 
Lobby, the Federal Minimum Wage is US$7.25 per hour, calculated 
based upon a forty-hour work week, which amounts to US$290 in 
pre-tax dollars.240 As such, a first trimester abortion costs roughly half 
of one month’s salary and a later term abortion can cost up to three 
months of salary.241 Due to other financial obligations, such as rent, 
food, transportation costs, child care, and other expenses, paying for 
an abortion out-of-pocket is often unaffordable for low-income 
women. 242  It is particularly likely that second trimester abortions 
would often be inaccessible because they would be prohibitively 
expensive.243 
The Court’s meager analysis in McRae also baldly illustrates the 
problem with a single-issue classification.244 Those that are affected 
by the Hyde Amendment’s funding restrictions are not just low-
income individuals. They are also women, who may be from various 
ethnic backgrounds; from a family that has recently emigrated to the 
United States; who may be young; married or unmarried; with 
children or without children; from a rural or urban environment. 
Restrictions on Medicaid funding disproportionately affect 
communities of color since fifty-nine percent of Medicaid recipients 
across the United States are non-white.245 By solely looking at one’s 
                                                                                                             
first trimester abortion); FAQs, WOMEN’S MED, supra note 7 (noting that the cost of abortion 
can be expected to increase about US$100 per week after eleven weeks gestation). 
240. Brief of the Guttmacher Institute and Professor Sara Rosenbaum as Amici Curiae in 
Support of the Government at 16 n.37, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014) (Nos. 13-354 & 13-356) (calculating a low-income woman’s weekly wage based upon 
minimum wage); see also Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as Amended § 206(a)(1)(c) 
(establishing the federal minimum wage rate of US$7.25 as of July 24, 2009). 
241.  Brief of the Guttmacher Institute and Professor Sara Rosenbaum as Amici Curiae 
in Support of the Government at 16 n.37, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354 & 13-356) (using the minimum wage to calculate a low-income 
woman’s weekly wage); see also Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as Amended § 
206(a)(1)(c) (setting the federal minimum wage rate of US$7.25 per hour). 
242. See Are You in the Know?, supra note 239 (noting the first trimester abortion cost); 
FAQs, WOMEN’S MED, supra note 7 (calculating costs of obtaining an abortion increases 
roughly US$100 per week after eleven weeks gestation). 
243. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
244. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314-18 (1980) (focusing solely on the women’s 
indigency rather than her experience as a low-income individual and a woman); see also 
Palencia, supra note 44, at 275-76 (noting that low-income women will disproportionately 
bear the impact of the Hyde Amendment and Harris v. McRae). 
245. See Distribution of the Nonelderly with Medicaid by Race/Ethnicity, supra note 231 
(disaggregating statistics by racial classification of Medicaid recipients). 
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income, the gender and racial factors that could also be the basis for 
suspect classifications are overlooked.246  Had the Court in McRae 
looked at the disproportionate impact that these Medicaid restrictions 
would have on (1) women as the only group that would need to have 
access to an abortion procedure, (2) their inability to access their 
fundamental right to choose an abortion without the financial support 
through the Medicaid program that provided comprehensive health 
insurance for low income individuals, which (3) disproportionately 
impacted communities of color and young women, the Court would 
be seeing a fuller picture of the impact on the restriction of the 
fundamental right. 247  By reviewing these additional factors to 
determine whether these regulations are discriminatory against 
individuals that trigger protected class status multiple times, the Court 
would at least need to ensure that the regulation would be narrowly 
tailored to achieve an important government purpose, necessarily 
elevating the level of scrutiny applied.248 Because intersectionality 
focuses on multiple historical grounds for discrimination including 
race, national origin, and gender, strict scrutiny should be applied, 
requiring the regulation to be narrowly tailored and the least 
restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest.249As 
applied to Whole Woman’s Health, the District Court emphasized the 
burdens created by the admitting privileges and ambulatory surgical 
center requirements on women themselves:   
[T]ravel distances [resulting from widespread clinic closures] 
combine . . . with the following practical concerns to create a de 
facto barrier to abortion for some women: ‘lack of availability of 
child care, unreliability of transportation, unavailability of 
appointments at abortion facilities, unavailability of time off 
from work, immigration status and inability to pass border 
checkpoints, poverty level, the time and expense involved in 
                                                                                                             
246. See Crenshaw, supra note 223, at 140 (noting that ′′the intersectional experience is 
greater than the sum of racism and sexism.”); see also Palencia, supra note 44, at 272-75 
(emphasizing the Court’s failure to apply heightened scrutiny). 
247. See Crenshaw, supra note 223, at 140; see also Palencia, supra note 44, at 225.  
248. See Bridges, supra note 36, at 1319-34 (analyzing the legitimacy of the test of 
balancing government interests and individual rights and reviews whether there is any 
government interest in protecting fetal life); see also Palencia, supra note 44, at 272-78 (noting 
the Court’s failures to apply heightened scrutiny and its focus on the sole classification of 
indigency in its analysis). 
249. See Crenshaw, supra note 223, at 140; see also Palencia, supra note 44 at 225. 
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traveling long distances, and other, inarticulable psychological 
obstacles.’250 
In order to fully address the burdens that these TRAP laws place 
on women, the Court must consider at a minimum the woman’s 
gender, income, age, immigration status, child-care options, and 
residence.251 Applying an intersectional lens to view discrimination 
should ensure that women of color, young women, low-income 
women, or women living in a certain state or region of that state are 
not disproportionately precluded from accessing abortion services.252 
3. The Impact of Abortion Restrictions on Access to Services: 
Zooming in on Texas 
Abortion regulations that create barriers to actually accessing the 
procedure disproportionately affect lower income women, young 
women, and women of color.253 Under the undue burden standard of 
review developed through Casey, the Court’s refusal to strike down 
the twenty-four hour waiting period, parental consent, and “informed 
consent” laws has led to a deluge of similar restrictions across the 
country, purportedly intended to encourage women to reconsider their 
decision about terminating their pregnancies or protect women’s 
health. 254  These arbitrary requirements—waiting certain lengths of 
                                                                                                             
250. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Brief for Petitioners at *24 (Sept. 3, 2015), Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015). 
251 . See Crenshaw, supra note 223, at 140 (noting the disproportionate impact of 
intersectional discrimination on individuals, which is greater than the sum of its parts); see 
also Hutchinson, supra note 226, at 301-07 (describing how ignoring intersectional 
discrimination overlooks the unique, more pronounced experience of facing discrimination on 
multiple bases). 
252. See Crenshaw supra note 223, at 146-49; see also Hutchinson, supra note 226, at 
301-07.  
253. See Fried, supra note 1, at 212-13 (noting that “[a]ccess has been undermined 
primarily through denial of public funding for abortion, parental involvement laws, and the 
loss of abortion services.”); see, e.g., Proposed Ban on Abortion After 20 Weeks Is Misguided 
and Harms Women’s Health, GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.guttmacher.
org/media/inthenews/2015/09/21/ (describing the disproportionate impact that the 20 week ban 
would have on low-income women because of travel requirements, cost barriers, waiting 
periods, and other hurdles). 
254. A state may regulate abortion as long as it does not have “the purpose or effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.” 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992); see Benson Gold & Nash, 
supra note 61, at 7 (noting that the regulations in effect throughout the United States are 
patently anti-abortion regulations that do not have the purpose of protecting women’s health). 
2016] A POSTAL CODE LOTTERY 687 
time or receiving certain information or permissions—require women 
to travel to the clinic on multiple occasions, increasing the cost of 
obtaining an abortion.255 Each time, women must arrange child care, 
take time off of work, and possibly travel considerable distances to 
the nearest clinic.256 
TRAP laws have led to the closure of countless clinics 
throughout the country and in Texas, based upon arbitrary 
requirements passed under the auspices of medical necessity for safer 
abortions, by requiring clinics to meet the standards of ambulatory 
surgical centers, mandating that providers to have admitting 
privileges to local hospitals, or require that clinics are located within a 
determined distance of local hospitals.257 Before the Supreme Court 
granted an injunction in Whole Woman’s Health, as few as eight 
clinics in the entire state of Texas would have remained open as a 
result of H.B. 2, primarily serving the urban areas in the state, and 
requiring rural women to travel considerable distances to access 
abortion services.258 
Women living in the Rio Grande Valley and El Paso were 
constructively isolated from accessing reproductive care services 
within their home state. 259  Even with these provisions enjoined 
                                                                                                             
255. See Fried, supra note 1, at 213 (“Clearly, some welfare recipients cannot afford 
abortions at all. Others are forced to divert money from other essentials, such as food, rent, and 
utilities. Even when women are able to raise the money, the time it takes to search for funding 
makes it more likely they will need a more costly and more difficult second-trimester 
procedure.”); FAQs, WOMEN’S MED, supra note 7 (stating that the cost of abortion increases 
by roughly US$100 per week after eleven weeks gestation and can cost up to US$3,000); see 
also Texas Abortion Clinic Map, FUND TEXAS CHOICE, http://fundtexaschoice.org/resources/
texas-abortion-clinic-map/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2016) (showing the sparse distribution of 
clinics throughout Texas). 
256.  See State Policies in Brief: TRAP Laws, supra note 196 (highlighting discrepancies 
between the TRAP laws in effect by State); see also Benson Gold & Nash, supra note 61, at 7-
12 (detailing the impact of TRAP laws on abortion access). 
257. See State Policies in Brief: TRAP Laws, supra note 196 (demonstrating differences 
between the TRAP laws in effect by State); see also Benson Gold & Nash, supra note 61, at 7-
12 (describing the impact of TRAP laws on access to abortion services). 
258. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 576 U.S. 56 (2015) (granting a stay to the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision that would have allowed the H.B. 2 provisions to go into effect); see 
also Texas Abortion Clinic Map, supra note 255 (describing current clinics that are open and 
the services that they provide). 
259. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, No. 14-50928 *at 55 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating 
that the closest clinic to El Paso in Texas is 550 miles away); see also Fernandez & Eckholm, 
supra note 8, at 3 (noting that the court found the 550 mile requirement permissible since 
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currently, women in the Rio Grande valley have great difficulty 
accessing any reproductive health services since there are not nearby 
clinics, few people have access to transportation, and many women 
living in the valley are undocumented.260 As such, many women rely 
on Misoprostol smuggled across the border from Mexico without 
clear instructions on how to take the medication safely.261 Due to the 
draconian measures included within H.B. 2, such limited access to 
abortion institutionalizes stigma, severely restricts access to abortion, 
and requires women to risk their lives to exercise their 
constitutionally protected rights. 262  As access is narrowing, it is 
imperative that the United States addresses the rising incidence of 
unsafe abortion, not by placing further restrictions on abortion, but 
instead by striking down problematic restrictions that leave women 
with no choice but to resort to these unsafe measures to access their 
fundamental right to obtain an abortion. 263  Beyond maintaining 
abortion as a legal right, without a strong reproductive justice 
response to fight against barriers that restrict abortion access—
predominantly impacting low-income women, young women, and 
women of color—the United States may be returning to the pre-Roe 
days where women are more likely to obtain unsafe, clandestine 
                                                                                                             
women were already traveling to New Mexico to obtain abortions but the 235 mile distance for 
women in the Rio Grande Valley did pose an undue burden). 
260. See Hellerstein, supra note 8, at 3 (discussing the increase in women crossing into 
Mexico to gain access to Misoprostol, which is a medicine that can be used to induce 
abortion); see also Nuestro Texas Report, supra note 12, at 6 (describing the particular 
challenges that women in the Rio Grande Valley to gain access to reproductive health 
services). 
261. See Hellerstein, supra note 8, at 3 (noting the trend to seek abortions outside of 
clinics as abortion services within clinics are more difficult to access); Texas Threat to 
Abortion Clinics Dodged at Flea Markets, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (July 11, 2013), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-11/flea-market-abortions-thrive-as-texas-may-
close-clinics (describing the common practice of women taking black market Misoprostol to 
induce abortion). 
262. See Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, supra note 
187, ¶¶ 24-25 (noting the impact that overly restrictive regulations have on the safety of 
abortion); 2012 SAFE ABORTION GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 86 (describing the correlation 
between the restrictive nature of abortion laws and the rate of unsafe abortions). 
263. Hellerstein, supra note 8, at 3 (describing how women are filling the gap to access 
essential abortion services by self-inducing using smuggled Misoprostol from Mexico); see 
State Policies in Brief: TRAP Laws, supra note 196 (describing that TRAP laws have no 
benefit on the patient’s health and illustrating how far reaching these regulations are). 
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abortions. 264  Viewing these abortion restrictions through an 
intersectional lens as part of a composite Equal Protection-Due 
Process Clause analysis will help to address the disproportionate 
impact that these barriers have on low-income women, young women, 
and women of color.265 
B. Criminalization of Abortion in Northern Ireland: Discriminatory 
and Stigmatizing 
Continued criminalization of abortion in Northern Ireland is 
impermissible and must be brought in line with the rest of the United 
Kingdom’s abortion policies. The Courts have held that NHS is a 
residence-based system such that NHS Trusts in other jurisdictions 
are not obligated to provide abortion services to Northern Irish 
women, and Northern Ireland is permitted to keep its restrictive legal 
framework in place where abortions are only permitted in extremely 
limited circumstances. 266  Conversely, England does provide its 
residents with coverage for abortion services for sixty to ninety 
percent of the cost of the procedure.267 Within the United Kingdom, 
not only does this mean that Northern Irish women are not afforded 
the same care as English women, but also Northern Irish women need 
                                                                                                             
264. Hellerstein, supra note 8, at 8 (noting the large numbers of women in the Rio 
Grande Valley that are purchasing Misoprostol to induce abortion); Texas Threat to Abortion 
Clinics Dodged at Flea Markets, supra note 261, at 4 (describing the limited choices that low-
income, undocumented women living in the Rio Grande Valley have to access abortion 
services). 
265. See supra Part III.A.2 (describing the intersectional framework). 
266. See supra Part II.A.2 (describing the current legal framework governing abortion 
access in Northern Ireland); see also R. (on the application of A) v. Secretary of State for 
Health, [2014] EWHC 1364 (Admin), [58], 2014 WL 1220042 (enabling NHS Trusts to 
decline to cover services for Northern Irish women); Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission’s Application for Judicial Review, ¶¶ 3-5 [2015] NIQB 102, 2015 WL 9112625 
(determining that prohibiting abortion for fatal fetal abnormalities and pregnancies as a result 
of sexual crime cannot be interpreted as Convention-compliant, but is considered provisional 
for other courts or the legislature to decide). 
267. Compare Abortion, NHS CHOICES, http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/Abortion/Pages/
Introduction.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2015) (noting that NHS will cover sixty – ninety 
percent of an abortion procedure, depending upon location), with R. (on the application of A), 
[2014] EWHC 1364 (Admin.), ¶ 4 (“[The claimant] was able to access such services, albeit 
they were those provided privately by an independent clinic, outside the NHS for a fee. . . .”). 
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to spend up to GB£2,000 to travel to England to obtain abortion 
services from a private provider.268  
Although the European Court of Human Rights held in A, B and 
C v. Ireland that requiring Irish women to travel to England to obtain 
abortions was not in itself a violation of Article 8, the right to respect 
for private and family life, the Northern Irish situation is 
distinguishable.269 Northern Irish women are citizens of the United 
Kingdom and are unable to obtain the same treatment as those in the 
other jurisdictions of the United Kingdom, as acknowledged in 
NIHRC Judicial Review. 270  This amounts to the State’s arbitrary 
infringement on a woman’s right to respect for private and family 
life. 271  Since the United Kingdom passed the 1967 Abortion Act, 
according to Tysiąc v. Poland, once abortion is legal in certain 
circumstances, “[the State] must not structure its legal framework in a 
way which would limit real possibilities to obtain [abortion].”272 The 
United Kingdom is limiting real possibilities for its citizens to obtain 
abortions by allowing Northern Ireland to maintain a severely 
restrictive legal framework through criminalizing abortion in most 
circumstances and precluding NHS abortion coverage for Northern 
                                                                                                             
268. See NHS CHOICES, supra note 267 (describing the services available through the 
NHS to women from English, Scottish, and Welsh jurisdictions, but not the Northern Irish 
jurisdiction); Northern Ireland: Barriers to Accessing Abortion Services, supra note 18, at 18, 
29 (noting the costs of traveling to other UK jurisdictions to access abortion services). 
269. A, B and C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 224, 239-42 (2010) (stating 
that the margin of appreciation allows the Republic of Ireland to require Irish women to travel 
to another State to obtain access to abortion services); see Abortion Act 1967 § 7(3) (stating 
that Northern Ireland is exempt from the requirement to provide abortion services to women 
up to twenty-four weeks pregnant in instances of health and fetal impairment). 
270.  Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for Judicial Review, ¶¶ 
154, 171 [2015] NIQB 96, 2015 WL 8131461 (stating that the R court did not find differing 
access to abortion based on one’s residence within the United Kingdom to constitute 
discrimination when considered with or without Article 8); see also R. (on the Application of 
A) v. Secretary of State for Health, C1/2014/1687 [2015] EWCA Civ. 771, [47]-[50], 2015 
WL 4401470 (stating that pregnant women from Northern Ireland compared to other women 
from the United Kingdom do not experience discrimination on prescribed grounds in their 
inability to access NHS coverage for abortion services). 
271. See ECHR, supra note 153, arts. 8, 14 (applying the right to respect for private and 
family life and non-discrimination principle contained in the Convention, the NHS “postcode 
lottery” denying women access to abortion services denies both rights); NHS CHOICES, supra 
note 267 (describing NHS coverage requirements, indicating which jurisdictions will perform 
abortion services and which will not). 
272.  Tysiąc v. Poland, No. 5410/03 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 116 (2007); see Abortion Act 1967 
§ 1(1), 7(3) (establishing the instances in which abortion is permitted in the United Kingdom). 
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Irish women.273 Therefore, denying Northern Irish women access to 
abortions is in violation of Article 8, the right to respect for private 
and family life.274 
Infringing upon women’s ability to obtain an abortion in 
Northern Ireland also amounts to unequal, discriminatory treatment in 
violation of Article 14, which states that discrimination is prohibited 
“on any ground such as sex, . . . association with a national 
minority. . . .” 275  Since abortion is a health procedure that only 
women need protected under Article 8, the denial of this procedure 
amounts to discrimination on the basis of sex when it is not 
provided. 276  Similarly, women from Northern Ireland could be 
considered to have an association with a different national minority 
by being Northern Irish; a Northern Irish woman receives patently 
different treatment than women from the rest of the United Kingdom, 
which amounts to de jure and de facto discrimination.277 Since the 
1967 Abortion Act has written into the statute that the Act does not 
apply to Northern Ireland, this is de jure discrimination of an essential 
                                                                                                             
273.  Tysiąc v. Poland, No. 5410/03 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 118 (2007). (stating that once 
abortion is permitted within a country, obstacles to obtaining that right to abortion cannot be 
imposed); see supra Part II.A (specifying that abortion is currently criminalized in all 
circumstances except when it is necessary to preserve a pregnant woman’s life, or if there is a 
risk of a long-term, permanent injury to her physical or mental health, which is real and has a 
serious adverse effect despite the provisional view in NIHRC Judicial Review); R. (on the 
Application of A) v. Secretary of State for Health, C1/2014/1687 [2015] EWCA Civ. 771, 
[58], 2015 WL 4401470 (holding that Article 8 is not violated by the availability of abortion 
services in England for Northern Irish women for cost). See generally Erdman, supra note 170, 
at 121-42 (describing the European Court of Human Rights’ approach to abortion 
jurisprudence). 
274.  Tysiąc v. Poland, No. 5410/03 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 116 (2007) (permitting abortion 
within a country means that real obstacles to obtaining access to abortion cannot be imposed); 
ECHR, supra note 153, art. 8 (establishing a right to respect for private and family life). 
275.  ECHR, supra note 153, art. 14. 
276 . Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 24, Women and Health (Article 12), ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1 
(1999) (“It is discriminatory for a State party to refuse to provide legally for the performance 
of certain reproductive health services for women.”). See generally Ginsburg, supra note 93, at 
375-86 (describing the importance of applying the equality framework to address pregnancy-
related issues, including the abortion question). 
277. ECHR, supra note 153, art. 14 (establishing protected class status for association 
with a national minority). See generally Bitton, supra note 39, at 594 (noting the limitations of 
de jure discrimination analysis and how de jure analysis does not always capture individuals 
who experience de facto discrimination). 
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health service protected under Article 8 of the European 
Convention.278  
Furthermore, the fact that the only way that Northern Irish 
women can access an essential health service is by paying as much as 
GB£2,000 to travel to other parts of the United Kingdom to obtain the 
procedure from a private provider also limits who is able to access 
abortions in practical effect, therefore also amounting to de facto 
discrimination. 279  As the High Court acknowledges in NIHRC 
Judicial Review with respect to limited circumstances: 
There is evidence that such a provision, forcing these young 
women to travel to England and Wales, can have the 
consequence of imposing a crushing burden on those least able to 
bear it. . . . [S]uch criminal provisions requiring them to travel 
abroad to have an abortion will impose a heavy financial burden 
upon them. That burden will weigh heavier on those of limited 
means.280 
As Northern Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom, the United 
Kingdom is obligated to ensure that Northern Irish women are able to 
obtain the same access to abortion as women that live in the rest of 
the United Kingdom without requiring women to travel to other 
jurisdictions.281 
                                                                                                             
278 . Abortion Act 1967 § 7(3) (excluding Northern Ireland from requirements to 
broaden abortion access); Tysiąc v. Poland, No. 5410/03 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 116 (2007) (noting 
that once abortion is legal within a territory, the legal framework must not be structured “in a 
way which would limit real possibilities to obtain it”). 
279.  Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for Judicial Review, ¶ 
154 [2015] NIQB 96, 2015 WL 8131461 (stating the heavier burden that lower income women 
experience if unable to obtain charitable assistance or family support); Northern Ireland: 
Barriers to Accessing Abortion Services, supra note 18, at 18, 29 (describing travel costs to 
obtain an abortion in other UK jurisdictions); Fegan & Rebouche, supra note 134, at 227-28 
(noting the costs involved to travel to England for abortion services and the difficulty 
obtaining medical follow-up for the procedure). 
280. Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application for Judicial Review, ¶ 
154 [2015] NIQB 96, 2015 WL 8131461 (noting that being required to travel to England or 
Wales in the exceptional categories of fatal fetal impairment and pregnancy as a result of 
sexual crime places heavy emotional and financial demands on women). 
281. See supra Part II.A.1 (describing Northern Ireland’s government structure); Tysiąc 
v. Poland, No. 5410/03 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 116 (2007) (stating that the legal framework must not 
be structured “in a way which would limit real possibilities to obtain it” once abortion is legal 
in a territory). 
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CONCLUSION 
The United States and Northern Ireland share the concept that 
the jurisdiction in which a woman lives determines her access to her 
fundamental rights.282 In the United States, the right in question is her 
fundamental right to an abortion whereas in Northern Ireland, the 
rights in question are her right to respect for private and family life 
and the prohibition of discrimination. 283  Since there are entire 
demographics of people who cannot access safe abortion services 
within their jurisdiction and who are required to travel over borders to 
obtain them, the associated costs to obtain the procedure have a 
discriminatory effect on low-income communities.284 For equality to 
be achievable, the courts must root out invidious, intersectional 
discrimination and ensure that cost concerns do not pose barriers to 
women’s access to their fundamental rights.285 
Accordingly, despite the fact that few courts have explicitly 
rendered judgments to this effect, targeting abortion—health services 
that only women need—constitutes sex discrimination.286 Restricting 
abortion threatens core, reproductive rights that must be secured for 
women to achieve equality. 287  As such, the future of abortion 
litigation should include a non-discrimination prong that enables 
women of any age, from all income levels, any ethnic background, 
and hailing from any jurisdiction within the United States and United 
Kingdom to access safe, legal abortion services.288 One’s postal code 
should not preclude a woman from accessing safe, legal abortion 
services that are available within other jurisdictions in the United 
States and the United Kingdom.289 
                                                                                                             
282. See supra Parts 1.A.2, II.A.2-3 & III.A.3 (noting the particular challenges that 
women in Texas and Northern Ireland have in accessing abortion services). 
283. See supra Parts I.A.1, II.B (analyzing the legal context for the abortion right in the 
United States and European Court of Human Rights, respectively). 
284. See supra Parts II.A.3, III.A (discussing the impact that abortion restrictions have 
on requiring women to travel to obtain the procedure). 
285 . See supra Part III.A.2 (describing the intersectional approach to determining 
suspect classification). 
286 . See supra Parts I.B, II.B (noting that Courts have generally avoided deciding 
abortion cases on equality grounds). 
287. See supra Parts I.B, II.C (describing the importance of having access to abortion as 
a critical woman’s right). 
288 . See supra Parts III.A.2, III.B (noting the importance of applying an anti-
discrimination lens in reviewing regulations on abortion). 
289. See supra Part III (describing the inaccessibility of abortion due to legal barriers). 
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